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Why Strickland is the Wrong Test for
Violations of the Right to Testify
Daniel J. Capra∗
Joseph Tartakovsky∗∗
Abstract
A criminal accused has a constitutional right to testify in his
own defense. The right has an undisputed place alongside the
most important “personal” rights, like the right to remain silent or
the right to represent oneself. But in the 1990s, courts began to
apply the ineffective-assistance test of Strickland v. Washington to
evaluate claims by a defendant that his right to testify was
abridged. In practice this nullifies the right. Moreover, the
Strickland test is inapposite because it focuses on counsel and not
the defendant’s right to testify. This Article proposes a new test to
better secure and enforce the right, without subjecting courts to
burdensome post-trial motions.
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I. What Is the Constitutional Right to Testify?
A. Origins and Meaning Today
Anyone born since the invention of television knows that the
“Fifth” allows you to keep silent in the face of a prosecution.1 But
what about the converse right—the right, during that
prosecution, to speak up, to give your side, to explain the
mistakes of witnesses, to justify yourself? This is the right to
testify, and like the right against compelled self-incrimination, it
is a right that defendants decide whether to exercise in every
criminal trial. Yet the accused’s right to choose to testify is often
violated with impunity by lawyers.

1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
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A century and a half ago, American states followed the
common law in disabling criminal defendants from testifying.2
The notion behind these so-called “incompetency” statutes was
that the self-serving testimony of a defendant was inherently
untrustworthy (if not perjurious)3 and that incompetency statutes
actually did the accused a favor—these laws protected the right
against self-incrimination by relieving defendants of the negative
inference that would be drawn if they were permitted to take the
stand but refused.4 Yet according to Justice Brennan in Ferguson
2. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 570 (1961) (describing “the
common-law rule that a person charged with a criminal offense is incompetent
to testify on his own behalf at his trial”).
3. See JAMES FITZGERALD STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 202 (1863) (“[I]t is not in human nature to speak the truth under
such a pressure as would be brought to bear on the prisoner, and it is not a light
thing to institute a system which would almost enforce perjury on every
occasion.”). For a good state case on this subject, see State v. Wilcox, 175 S.E.
122, 123 (N.C. 1934), in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed a
trial judge who instructed that “‘the law presumes when a man is being tried for
crime that he is naturally laboring under a temptation to testify to whatever he
thinks may be necessary to clear himself of the charge.’” But see McVeigh v.
United States, 78 U.S. 259, 267 (1870) (rejecting the rationale that a defendant
should be disqualified from testifying because he has the incentive to testify
falsely). The Court stated:
If assailed there, he could defend there. The liability and the right are
inseparable. A different result would be blot upon our jurisprudence
and civilization. We cannot hesitate or doubt on the subject. It would
be contrary to the first principle of the social compact and of the right
administration of justice.
Id.
4. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 571–76, 581–82 (describing the historical
justifications for incompetency statutes). For this reason, the federal
competency statute, first enacted in 1878, but provided in its present form in
1948, reads as follows:
In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against
the United States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts
of inquiry in any State, District, Possession or Territory, the person
charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure
to make such request shall not create any presumption against him.
18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2006) (emphasis added); see also 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 579 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979) (examining
competency laws in the United States). But see Benson v. United States, 146
U.S. 325, 335–36 (1892) (discussing the erosion of competency laws in the
United States); United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. 203, 210–11 (1842) (describing
exceptions to the common law incompetency rule); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *370 (“But as it is perfectly obvious that any witness who can
throw any light upon the subject, should be allowed to state what he knows . . . ,
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v. Georgia,5 decided in 1961, experience made us wiser.6 Maine
acted first, in 1864, enacting a general competency act for
criminal defendants;7 by the end of the nineteenth century, every
state but Georgia followed.8 “In a vast number of instances,” the
Supreme Court explained in Wilson v. United States,9 in 1893,
discussing the effects of the federal competency statute enacted
fifteen years earlier, “the innocence of the defendant of the charge
with which he was confronted has been established.”10
Lawyers came to believe that the “shutting out of his sworn
evidence could be positively hurtful to the accused, and that
innocence was in fact aided, not prejudiced, by the opportunity of
the accused to testify under oath.”11 The defendant, wrote the
the stringent rules of our former law have been gradually relaxed by a series of
modern statutes.”); William A. Maury, Validity of Statutes Authorizing the
Accused to Testify, 14 AM. L. REV. 753, 754 (1880) (attacking the validity of
competency statutes).
5. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
6. See id. at 580–81 (“Experience under the American competency
statutes was to change the minds of many who had opposed them. It was seen
that the shutting out of his sworn evidence could be positively hurtful to the
accused . . . .”).
7. See Act of Mar. 25, 1864, ch. 280, 1864 Me. Laws 214 (codified as
amended at ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 1315 (2011)) (providing that defendants are
competent witnesses in prosecutions for all crimes). Prior to enacting the 1864
law, Maine enacted a competency law in 1859. See Act of Apr. 2, 1859, ch. 104,
1859 Me. Laws 97 (providing that defendants are competent witnesses in
prosecutions for certain minor crimes); see also Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577
(describing Maine’s adoption of competency statutes in 1859 and 1864 and
similar actions by other states).
8. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577 n.6 (listing the years in which states
adopted competency acts). Congress enacted the federal analogue in March
1878. See 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2006) (discussing federal and state competency
legislation).
9. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
10. Id. at 66; see also Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)
[T]he truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of
all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have
knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and
weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by the court,
rather than by rejecting witnesses as incompetent, with the result
that this principle has come to be widely, almost universally, accepted
in this country and in Great Britain.
11. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 580–81 (1961). The Court made a
similar statement in a case decided after the common law rule was abrogated:
This rule, while affording great protection to the accused against
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Court, “above all others may be in a position to meet the
prosecution’s case.”12 Ferguson invalidated a Georgia statute that
limited a defendant’s presentation to unsworn statements
without questioning from counsel.13 The Court rested on the
Assistance of Counsel Clause.14 It implied, but did not recognize,
a right to testify under the Constitution.15
That task was left to Rock v. Arkansas16 in 1987. “At this
point in the development of our adversary system,” wrote Justice
unfounded accusation, in many cases deprived him from explaining
circumstances tending to create conclusions of his guilt which he
could readily have removed if permitted to testify. To relieve him
from this embarrassment the law was passed. In mercy to him, he is
by the act in question permitted upon his request to testify in his own
behalf in the case. In a vast number of instances the innocence of the
defendant of the charge with which he was confronted has been
established.
Wilson, 149 U.S. at 65–66.
12. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 582.
13. See id. at 596 (“We therefore hold that, in effectuating the provisions of
§ 38-415, Georgia, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, could not, in
the context of § 38-416, deny appellant the right to have his counsel question
him to elicit his statement.”).
14. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”).
15. See id. at 572 n.1, 596 (crafting a narrow holding). Justice Clark,
however, concurring, thought this was precisely what the Court was doing, as a
matter of logical necessity, and that it was needlessly formulaic and foolish not
to acknowledge this. See id. at 602 (Clark, J., concurring) (“Reaching the basic
issue of incompetency . . . I do not hesitate to state that in my view § 38-416
does not meet the requirements of due process and that, as an unsatisfactory
remnant of an age gone by, it must fall as surely as does its palliative, § 38415.”). In Fowle v. United States, the Ninth Circuit relied on Justice Clark’s
concurrence to find a constitutional right, apparently because all the judges
agreed that such a right existed. See Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 53
(9th Cir. 1969) (“The Government says that if [the defendant] had wished to
avoid all adverse inferences which might be drawn from his original silence in
reliance on his constitutional rights, he should have sacrificed his constitutional
right to testify in his own defense.” (emphasis added)).
16. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (“The right to testify on one’s own
behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several provisions of the Constitution. It
is one of the rights that ‘[is] essential to due process of law in a fair adversary
process.’” (citation omitted)). For a typical pre-Rock discussion of the right in a
U.S. Court of Appeals, see Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 1969), in
which the Seventh Circuit stated:
In the federal courts, the privilege of an accused to testify in his own
defense is merely statutory, abrogating the common law rule of
incompetence . . . . No case has been brought to our attention to
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support petitioner’s contention that the Fourteenth Amendment
accords a defendant in a state court a federal constitutional right to
testify. To the contrary, the federal rule seems to be that the exercise
of this right is subject to the determination of competent trial counsel
and varies with the facts of each case.
On the other hand, United States v. Von Roeder seemed to suggest that if a trial
judge went too far in dissuading a willing defendant from testifying (say, by
pointing out the dangers of cross-examination or perjury), this might violate a
constitutional right or result in some other impropriety. See United States v.
Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004, 1008–09 (10th Cir. 1970) (analyzing a judge’s role in
notifying a defendant of the possible effects of testifying at trial). Winters v.
Cook stated that there exist certain “inherently personal fundamental right[s]”
that “can be waived only by the defendant and not by his attorney,” which
include the “right to testify personally.” Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 179 (5th
Cir. 1973). In United States v. Poe, the D.C. Circuit reversed a jury verdict, in
accord with the ruling of the district court, which felt the trial was unfair
because defense counsel gave legally incorrect advice about impeachment. See
United States v. Poe, 352 F.2d 639, 640–41 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“The trial judge
found that appellant was deprived of a fair trial because he was misinformed as
to the consequences of taking the stand to deny the charges against him.”). But
otherwise lawyers are “free to keep defendants from testifying whenever counsel
see fit. Any suggestion to the contrary is chimerical.” Id.
Courts of decades past were also in the habit of holding that if a defendant
retained his choice of counsel, no error by that attorney, however grave, could
constitute “a denial of due process chargeable to the state.” United States ex rel.
Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 425–26 (3d Cir. 1953); see also Hudspeth v.
McDonald, 120 F.2d 962, 967–68 (10th Cir. 1941) (stating that counsel was
drunk for most of trial and finding no error).
Yet, in the 1970s, a number of states held that the right to testify existed.
See, e.g., State v. Noble, 514 P.2d 460, 461 (Ariz. 1973) (“It is well established
that in criminal prosecutions an accused has the right to testify in his own
behalf.” (citations omitted)); People v. Robles, 466 P.2d 710, 716 (Cal. 1970) (“We
are satisfied that the right to testify in one’s own behalf is of such fundamental
importance that a defendant who timely demands to take the stand contrary to
the advice given by his counsel has the right to give an exposition of his defense
before a jury.”). The Supreme Court of Alaska, in Hughes v. State, stated:
[I]t is preferable that a defendant be permitted to testify if he so
requests. The right to testify in one’s own behalf is often of vital
importance in a trial. No defendant requesting to testify should be
deprived of exercising that right and conveying his version of the
facts to the court or jury, regardless of competent counsel’s advice to
the contrary.
Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Alaska 1973). But it did not explicitly
ground this in any constitution, state or federal, and found waiver of the right in
any event. See id. at 1120 (“In the instant case, based on all of the testimony we
conclude that Hughes knowingly and intelligently waived his right to testify.”).
Other states held that a criminal defendant had no constitutional right to
testify on his own behalf. See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d 553, 554
(Mo. 1970) (referencing Ferguson and stating that “the assumption that the
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Blackmun, “it cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal
case has the right to take the witness stand and to testify in his
or her own defense.”17 The right had its “source” in three
provisions.18 The Due Process Clause19 secures “‘an opportunity to
be heard . . . a right to [a] day in court.’”20 The Compulsory
Process Clause21 guarantees an accused’s right to call witnesses
in his favor—and the “most important witness . . . in many
criminal cases is the defendant himself.”22 Finally, the right to
testify was seen as a “necessary corollary” of the Self-

right to testify is a constitutional right is erroneous” and that “the assumption
ignores the history of the right”).
17. Rock, 483 U.S. at 49. One court, a few years earlier, observed that it
seemed “surprising” that the Supreme Court had not yet explicitly ruled on this
question, but noted that incompetency statutes had been abrogated in every
jurisdiction in the country and that “as a practical matter a defendant’s right to
testify is rarely questioned.” Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 920 (7th Cir. 1982).
Alicea contains a rich discussion of the development of the right and its gradual
recognition by one court after another. See generally id.; see also United States
ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 118–19 (3d Cir. 1977) (discussing the
right to testify in light of the “due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
18. See United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1983) (providing
an intelligent discussion of the history of the right and finding the right implicit
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment). Judge Cardamone, for the panel, found that
because the right exists but is not enumerated, the Ninth Amendment was
worth invoking. See id. (“That this unmentioned right is a constitutional one is
further fortified by the rule of construction contained in the Ninth
Amendment . . . .”); see also United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1406 (4th
Cir. 1969) (noting the maturation from incompetency to apparent constitutional
right and stating that “in a federal court, it is not less than a statutory right,
and it may not be denied a defendant if, being advised, he elects to exercise it”).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .”).
20. Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) and
citing Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 602 (1961) (Clark, J., concurring)). The
standards of review under the Due Process Clause, whether the Clause appears
in the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, are the same.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to . . . have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor . . . .”).
22. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).
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Incrimination Clause,23 because every defendant is “‘privileged to
testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so.’”24
Rock relied heavily on Faretta v. California,25 the case from
1975 that established the constitutional right of selfrepresentation.26 Faretta read the Sixth Amendment27 to secure a
“personal” right to represent oneself: “It is the accused, not
counsel, who must be ‘informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation,’ who must be ‘confronted with the witnesses against
him,’ and who must be accorded ‘compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.’”28 It is the “defendant, and not his lawyer
or the State, [who] will bear the personal consequences of a
conviction.”29 And though it may be “undeniable” that most
defendants could “better defend with counsel’s guidance than by
their own unskilled efforts,” wrote Justice Stewart, “his choice
must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is
the lifeblood of the law.’”30 The right to self-representation was
thus grounded in personal autonomy; the Court in Rock
emphatically recognized the right to testify in that light. Rock not
only drew on Faretta, but it explicitly stated: “Even more
fundamental to a personal defense than the right of selfrepresentation . . . is an accused’s right to present his own version
of events in his own words.”31
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
24. Rock, 483 U.S. at 52–53 (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225
(1971)).
25. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at
51–52 (discussing Faretta).
26. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807 (ruling that a state may not
“constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer
upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense”).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”).
28. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819.
29. Id. at 834.
30. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
31. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (emphasis added). The right
was reaffirmed unanimously in United States v. Dunnigan. See United States v.
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993) (stating that the right to testify is “made
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If the accused’s right to testify is unquestionably a
fundamental constitutional right, grounded in personal
autonomy, what is the remedy for violations of it? This Article
considers the virtually uniform assessment by federal courts that
the denial of the right to testify is a product of faulty lawyering
and as such the remedy lies in Strickland v. Washington32 and its
progeny—under which the defendant gets a retrial only if he can
show that had he testified, there is a “reasonable probability”
that the outcome of his trial would have been different.33 This
Strickland “prejudice” standard has been nearly impossible for
defendants to meet—resulting in a constitutional right without a
remedy.
B. The Right to Testify as Part of the Autonomy Line
When the Supreme Court in Rock relied on Faretta, it placed
the right to testify in what one might call the “free choice” line of
cases.34 The principle behind these holdings is that certain rights
are personal to the defendant—a matter of “dignity” and
“autonomy” rather than “strategy” or “tactics”—which only the
defendant, not his lawyer, can waive, and then only if knowingly
and voluntarily.35 Faretta was one instance of such “[f]reedom of
explicit by federal statute” and is “implicit in the Constitution”); see also Riggins
v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is well
established that the defendant has the right to testify on his own behalf, a right
we have found essential to our adversary system.”). One circuit called Rock’s
holding a “dictum” and assumed without deciding that the right to testify was
“fundamental.” See Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 52 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993)
(listing circuit court cases recognizing the right as fundamental).
32. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
33. Id. at 694.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th
Cir. 2011)
Although often framed as a right to testify, it is more properly framed
as a right to choose whether to testify. The “choice” concept reflects
the competing considerations that make up this right; while the Fifth
Amendment gives the accused the right to remain silent, courts have
recognized that the accused also has the absolute right to break his
silence and to testify.
(citations omitted).
35. See id. (“This right to choose is personal as well as fundamental, and
the defendant must make this decision himself.”).
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choice.”36 So, too, is the “‘profound’ choice” about whether to stand
trial or plead guilty (Cooper v. Oklahoma)37 or the personal “choice
of the petitioner” in deciding whether to appeal (Fay v. Noia).38
Other cases in this line include Brookhart v. Janis39 (a lawyer
cannot “overrid[e] his client’s desire” to exercise his “personal”
right to confront witnesses);40 McKaskle v. Wiggins41 (right to selfrepresentation “affirm[s] the dignity and autonomy of the accused”
and can be undermined by intrusive standby counsel);42 Adams v.
United States43 (defendant can insist on bench trial as matter of
“free choice by a self-determining individual,” which to deny is to

36. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.45 (1975) (citing the
constitutional protection afforded to a defendant’s free choice to testify in a
criminal proceeding). For a good illustration of how the right is grounded in
autonomy and not trial result, see Johnstone v. Kelly, 812 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1987). See also infra notes 185–89 and accompanying text.
37. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 364 (1996) (citing Godinez v. Moran,
509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993)).
38. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439–40 (1963); see also Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 92 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that in Fay the “critical
procedural decision—whether to take a criminal appeal—was entrusted to a
convicted defendant” and that the case’s touchstone was “the exercise of volition
by the defendant himself with respect to his own federal constitutional rights”);
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (stating that counsel must
support the defendant’s appeal to the best of counsel’s ability).
The Supreme Court said as recently as 1983 that “[t]here is, of course, no
constitutional right of appeal,” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983), though
it is hard to imagine that if such a question arose today, in a case in which a
substantial liberty or property interest was at stake, a majority of the Court
would care to say so again. For an illuminating discussion of this proposition,
see Shifflett v. Virginia, 447 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1971). The issue was the extent to
which lawyers must explain the rights of appeal to a client in order to enable the
client to make an informed decision about whether to exercise the right. See id.
at 53–54 (“To assure that the decision to take or forego an appeal would depend
only on the defendant’s own informed choice, we required in Nelson that he be
given complete information, by his lawyer or by the court, about his right to
appeal . . . .”).
39. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
40. Id. at 7. The Court seemed to be relying on the defendant’s rights to
cross-examine and confront witnesses against him, opportunities that a guilty
plea (or “prima facie” trial—apparently an Ohio state procedure of convenience)
would of course foreclose.
41. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
42. Id. at 176–77.
43. Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
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“imprison a man in his privilege and call it the Constitution”);44
and United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez45 (defendant usually has a
“right to counsel of choice”).46 These defendant-only decisions are
not among the multitude entrusted to counsel—even if the
accused’s choice is inimical to his best interests in view of the
bench and bar.47 Thus the Tenth Circuit wrote that a lawyer
“lacks authority to prevent a defendant from testifying in his own
defense, even when doing so is suicidal trial strategy.”48 “If a
defendant insists on testifying,” said the Seventh Circuit,
“however irrational that insistence might be from a tactical
viewpoint, counsel must accede.”49
44. Id. at 280–81; see also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930)
(affirming a defendant’s choice to waive his right to a trial by jury composed of
twelve members).
45. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
46. See id. at 147 (“The right to select counsel of one’s choice, by contrast,
has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring a fair
trial. It has been regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional
guarantee.”). But see infra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing
Gonzalez-Lopez and Wheat).
47. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)
It is also recognized that the accused has the ultimate authority to
make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to
whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf,
or take an appeal, . . . . [though an] indigent defendant [does not]
ha[ve][] a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press
nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of
professional judgment, decides not to present those points.
See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (“And although he may
conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be
honored . . . .”).
48. Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1171 (10th Cir. 2004); see also United
States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992) (“‘The wisdom or
unwisdom of the defendant’s choice does not diminish his right to make it.’”
(quoting Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1079 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting))); Ortega v. O’Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 261 (7th Cir. 1988) (“If a
defendant insists on testifying, no matter how unwise such a decision, the
attorney must comply with the request.”). Such a “suicidal” strategy may have
been undertaken in People v. Robles, where it appeared that the defendant was
perfectly indifferent to the success of his defense. See People v. Robles, 466 P.2d
710, 716–18 (Cal. 1970) (describing how the defendant insisted on testifying in
his own defense, was impeached by prior convictions, made damaging
admissions, engaged in offensive outbursts, and told jurors that they were “just
a bunch of fools”).
49. United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984).
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II. Why Strickland Should Not Be Applied in Right-to-Testify
Cases
A. The Results of Applying Strickland to Right-to-Testify Claims
Allegations by a defendant that his right to testify was
coercively abridged are common. The culprit is usually a lawyer
who said something like, “I make all decisions concerning this
case and I say you’re not going to testify.”50 At other times the
lawyer is alleged to have told the accused that he would call him
and then rested the case before doing so.51 Almost all such
allegations are brought on habeas petitions under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act52—with its
forbidding “doubly deferential” standards53—because discussions
between counsel and client are usually outside the record. They
occur in whispers at counsel table, in prison chambers, hallways,
or lawyers’ offices.54
50. Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1171 (10th Cir. 2004).
51. See United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995, 996–97 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(stating that defendant by all appearances planned to testify, fell ill on the day
he was to do so, and was persuaded by counsel not to testify). The defendant
argued that counsel might have sought a continuance. Id. at 997.
52. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
53. See Morris v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 677 F.3d 1117, 1126 (11th Cir. 2012)
(stating that “as a federal habeas court we are not applying Strickland de novo,
but rather through the additional prism of AEDPA deference” and determining
that “under this doubly deferential standard, ‘[t]he pivotal question is whether
the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable’”
(citations omitted)). For the phrase “doubly deferential,” see Knowles v.
Mirzavance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1,
5–6 (2003) (per curiam)).
54. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003) (“When an
ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel and
the court must proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for the object of
litigating or preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or inadequate for
this purpose.”); see also Guinan v. United States, 6 F.3d 468, 476 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“Lawyers who raise ineffective-assistance claims
on direct appeal do their clients a grave disservice, because the inevitable loss
will prevent the accused from raising the same claim later, when factual
development would permit accurate resolution.”). The Supreme Court in
Massaro adopted this reasoning. See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504 (“In light of the
way our system has developed, in most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is
preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance.”).
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Federal courts are loath to entertain these claims, usually
because the facts are that the defendant was advised to keep
quiet, wisely heeded his lawyers, and now regrets it. But courts
do look askance at instances in which a lawyer really seems to
have silenced a defendant against his will. The inquiry is
conducted under Strickland v. Washington, which states the test
for whether a lawyer was constitutionally adequate under the
Assistance of Counsel Clause.55 Why Strickland? The most-cited
case applying a Strickland analysis to deprivation of the right to
testify is United States v. Teague,56 an Eleventh Circuit case from
1992.57 But that circuit (and the Fifth Circuit, from which it was
55. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (stating that a
convicted defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and
that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant in some way).
56. United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
57. See id. at 1534 (“[W]e believe the appropriate vehicle for claims that the
defendant’s right to testify was violated by defense counsel is a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland . . . .”). As it happened, the
original panel that heard the case applied harmless-error review. See United
States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 757 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated, 932 F.2d 899
(11th Cir. 1991) (“Thus, the court concluded, because Teague’s testimony would
have been largely duplicative, any error in not allowing him to testify was
harmless.”). Before Teague, but after Strickland, that court reviewed such
claims under Chapman v. California as a sort of independent constitutional
violation of the right to testify, independent of any ineffectiveness claim. See
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding “that before a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); see also Nichols v.
Butler, 917 F.2d 518, 521 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated, 932 F.2d 900 (11th Cir.
1991) (finding that a Strickland analysis was unnecessary because “such
conduct by defense counsel amounts to a violation of the right to testify
regardless of whether it also amount to ineffectiveness of counsel”). Because this
case was vacated after an en banc poll and redecided after Teague, Strickland
now applied. See Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1550, 1552–54 (11th Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (applying Strickland).
The earliest case we find to connect Strickland and the right to testify is
United States v. Curtis, decided a few months after Strickland. See United
States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1074–76 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing the Strickland
presumption that a decision not to testify might be considered sound trial
strategy). The first post-Rock case we find specifically applying Strickland to a
right-to-testify claim is Isom v. Lockhart. See Isom v. Lockhart, 847 F.2d 484,
486 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying the two-prong Strickland test, which requires
objectively unreasonable representation by counsel and a reasonable likelihood
that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for this
representation). It was a habeas case in which the court applied Strickland
without much discussion. Id. The other claim involved the lawyer’s failure to
dismiss the venire after three veniremen—asked by the defendant’s attorney
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split) skirmished for years over how, judicially, to enforce the
right to testify, reaching a high point in Wright v. Estelle,58 a
brilliant en banc battle royale in 1978, and as eloquent a
discussion on the subject as can be found in the Federal Reporter.
In that case Archie Wright, on trial for murder and robbery,
was told by his lawyer that if he, Wright, testified, the lawyer
would withdraw; the attorney felt Wright’s version did not match
up with other accounts and that if the jury thought he, Wright,
was lying, he would get a death sentence.59 The circuit judges
split into two camps and put the case strikingly, worth relating at
length because they so capably capture the considerations
surrounding protection of the right to testify. One group, led by
Judge Thornberry, acknowledged that a defendant of course has

whether they understood that her client had the right both to testify and to
refuse to do so—said things like “I understand the law but I think if I was in it I
would want to testify . . . . I think I would be man enough to want to tell my
side.” Id. at 485. This latter claim is a classic Strickland question; perhaps the
court simply did not consider whether a different standard might apply to the
former claim.
The Ninth Circuit appears to have been second: in United States v. Hood, it
applied Strickland because the “right to testify certainly may implicate the sixth
amendment”—in a case in which the defendant argued that bad advice
dissuaded him from testifying to his advantage. United States v. Hood, No. 884046, 1989 WL 102017, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 1989). Galowski v. Murphy
provides another early statement, but it appears that the petitioner also tried to
assert the claim as an “independent constitutional violation,” but the claim was
barred for not having been asserted before. Galowski v. Murphy, 891 F.2d 629,
636 n.12 (7th Cir. 1989).
The district court in United States v. Butts, an impassioned decision given
shortly before Rock, rejected both parties’ argument that right-to-testify claims
were Strickland questions. See United States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145, 1148
(D. Me. 1986) (“The Court does not find Strickland applicable in this case.”).
Judge Carter said this was because the attorney’s conduct was “troublesome not
just for its possible impact on the reliability of the verdict, i.e., for its Sixth
Amendment implications,” but because of concerns for a fair trial under the
Fifth Amendment and the right to meet and deny accusations against a
defendant under the Sixth Amendment. Id. He also thought “a defendant’s right
to testify in a criminal proceeding against him [is] so basic to a fair trial that its
infraction can never be treated as harmless error, which is in essence the
inquiry required to be made by the second prong—prejudice to the defense—of
Strickland.” Id.
58. Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
59. Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 971, 972–74 (5th Cir. 1977), aff’d en banc,
572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1978).
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the right to reject or accept a lawyer to conduct his defense.60 But
once the defendant chooses to entrust his life and liberty to a
person versed in the law, that delegation includes the decision as
to whether the client testifies:
Trial attorneys are professional artisans working in a highly
competitive arena that requires all the skills which education,
training, and experience have given them. Criminal
defendants are entitled to no less. A defendant has a right to
necessary surgery, but he does not have the right to require
the surgeon to perform an operation contrary to accepted
medical practice. If, despite his counsel’s advice, a defendant
continues to believe that his testimony is more important than
the continued services of an attorney who insists he should not
take the stand, the conflict must be resolved by the court. Only
in this way may the right to testify be reconciled with the right
to effective assistance of counsel . . . .
While Faretta allows a defendant to have a fool for a
client . . . , there is nothing in its logic that commands that the
defendant may also have a fool for an attorney . . . . [T]he
decision whether to testify is properly allocated to the
defendant’s attorney and not to the defendant. An attorney is
not necessarily ineffective if he determines not to allow his
client to testify, even though he should give great deference to
a defendant’s desire to testify[;] however, we are here
concerned with constitutional requirements and there is no
constitutional requirement that a court-appointed attorney
must walk his client to the electric chair.61

Judge Godbold answered for himself and two others, relying on a
personal autonomy argument:
The rationale of Faretta v. California and its precursors,
relating to the right of the accused to defend himself, leads to
the conclusion that the right to testify is a fundamental right
reserved to the defendant for decision. In making the choice on
whether to testify, just as the choice on whether to represent
himself, the defendant elects whether to become an active
participant in the proceeding that affects his life and liberty
and to inject his own action, voice and personality into the
process to the extent the system permits.
60. See Wright, 572 F.2d at 1073 (Thornberry, J., specially concurring)
(“The defendant, of course, has the authority in the first instance to accept or
reject court-appointed representation.”).
61. Id. at 1073–74 (citation omitted).
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In the narrow world of the courtroom the defendant may have
faith, even if mistaken, in his own ability to persuasively tell
his story to the jury. He may desire to face his accusers and
the jury, state his position, and submit to examination. His
interest may extend beyond content to the hope that he will
have a personalized impact upon the jury or gain advantage
from having taken the stand rather than to seek the shelter of
the Fifth Amendment. Or, without regard to impact upon the
jury, his desire to tell “his side” in a public forum may be of
overriding importance to him. Indeed, in some circumstances
the defendant, without regard to the risks, may wish to speak
from the stand, over the head of judge and jury, to a larger
audience. It is not for his attorney to muzzle him.
....
Indeed, our history is replete with trials of defendants who
faced the court, determined to speak before their fate was
pronounced: Socrates, who condemned Athenian justice
heedless of the cup of hemlock; Charles I, who challenged the
jurisdiction of the Cromwellians over a divine monarch; Susan
B. Anthony, who argued for the female ballot; and Sacco and
Vanzetti, who revealed the flaws of their tribunal. To deny a
defendant the right to tell his story from the stand
dehumanizes the administration of justice. I cannot accept a
decision that allows a jury to condemn to death or
imprisonment a defendant who desires to speak, without ever
having heard the sound of his voice.62

Fourteen years later, in 1992, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en
banc in Teague, revisited the question. Without any considered
discussion, the court simply settled on this:
Because it is primarily the responsibility of defense counsel to
advise the defendant of his right to testify and thereby to
ensure that the right is protected, we believe that the
appropriate vehicle for claims that the defendant’s right to
testify was violated by defense counsel is a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland . . . .63

No authority was cited. Rock, decided five years earlier, certainly
never invoked the Assistance of Counsel Clause in support of the
right to testify.64 Nonetheless, other circuits, largely relying on
62.
63.
banc).
64.

Id. at 1077–78 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (en
See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51–53 (1987) (indicating that the
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Teague, were persuaded to adopt Strickland because the choice of
whether to testify is usually made in consultation with the
attorney.65 Today every circuit uses Strickland to evaluate rightto-testify claims, which can range from allegations of a mere

right to testify on one’s own behalf in a criminal trial is grounded in the
Constitution’s Compulsory Process Cause, Due Process Clause, and SelfIncrimination Clause).
65. See United States v. Espinoza, 392 F. App’x 666, 668 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“Because the choice whether to testify is often made in consultation with an
attorney, violations of the right to testify are ‘best treated’ as ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.” (citing Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1170
(10th Cir. 2004))). The panel in United States v. Tavares seemed to apply a sort
of heightened Strickland test:
A more reasonable approach, and one in keeping with Strickland’s
two-part test, is to continue to assign special significance to the
defendant’s precluded right to testify and at the same time to inquire
whether it is reasonably probable that the defendant’s testimony
would have changed the outcome of the trial in his favor.
United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Yet as late as 1998, the Eighth Circuit was willing to assert that, when the
error is defense counsel’s, “it is unclear if harmless error analysis applies to the
denial of a defendant’s right to testify.” Frey v. Schuetzle, 151 F.3d 893, 898 n.3
(8th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 248 n.11 (3d Cir.
1998) (emphasizing that it is a matter of judicial discretion to determine
whether a harmless-error analysis should be applied to actions committed by
the district court). These musings have been abandoned. See infra note 66.
In a few published (and still cited) opinions, the Seventh Circuit applied a
harmless-error test when the allegation of abridgment of the right was directed
at defense counsel. In Ortega v. O’Leary, the panel wrote that it “has previously
ruled that the Chapman standard applies when a petitioner has been denied the
right to testify.” Ortega v. O’Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing
Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)). Curiously,
years later, in Ward v. Sternes, that Circuit again applied Chapman’s harmlesserror standard (as had the district court under review) and found that:
[H]ad the jury been given the opportunity to observe Ward testify
while sober yet still exhibiting these signs of his mental deficiencies,
it is conceivable that the jury would have given more credence to the
expert psychiatric testimony and particularly Dr. Traugott’s opinion
that Ward’s brain injury alone, regardless of his intoxication, would
have rendered him incapable of conforming his actions to the law. On
this close question, the inability to hear Ward testify was not
harmless error.
Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 708 (7th Cir. 2003). But the discussion in
Alexander v. United States suggested that in most cases the circuit applies
Strickland. See Alexander v. United States, 219 F. App’x 520, 523 (7th Cir.
2007) (applying Strickland).
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failure to adequately inform a defendant about his right, all the
way to instances of genuine coercion that prevent its exercise.66
What has been the result? Strickland requires a petitioner
(usually proceeding pro se) to prove deficient performance by the
lawyer and prejudice to the client.67 The first prong usually
involves a dispute over what the defendant told his lawyer about
his desire to testify. Far more important is the “prejudice” prong.
It is here that the right is rendered a nullity. Under Strickland’s
second prong, the petitioner must show a “reasonable probability
66. See Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 57–59 (1st Cir. 2007)
(applying Strickland to a defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
relating to counsel’s alleged failure to inform defendant of his right to testify at
trial); Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 74 (2d Cir. 1997)
We conclude that the decision whether a defendant should testify at
trial is for the defendant to make, that trial counsel’s duty of effective
assistance includes the responsibility to advise the defendant
concerning the exercise of this constitutional right, and that the twopart test established in Strickland v. Washington, should be used to
assess a defendant’s claim that defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by preventing him from testifying or at least failing to
advise him concerning his right to testify.
See also Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 397 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[E]very
authority we are aware of that has addressed the matter of counsel’s failure to
advise a client of the right to testify has done so under Strickland’s two-prong
framework.”); Sayre v. Anderson, 238 F.3d 631, 634 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Sayre
contends only that his attorney interfered with his right to testify, not that the
state trial court (or prosecutor) did so.”); Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d 874, 882
(4th Cir. 1998) (“[A] criminal defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective because trial counsel failed to inform him of his right
to testify or because trial counsel forced him to testify must satisfy the twoprong test established in Strickland v. Washington . . . .”). In United States v.
Brown, the Fifth Circuit recently held that “[t]he appropriate vehicle for such
claims is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” United States v. Brown,
217 F.3d 247, 258–59 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see also United States v.
Hubbard, 638 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying Strickland); Matylinsky v.
Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Strickland standard is
applicable when a petitioner claims his attorney was ineffective by denying him
his constitutional right to testify.”); Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1170 (10th
Cir. 2004) (“We agree [with other circuits] that Mr. Cannon’s claim is best
treated as an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and analyze it as such.”);
Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 983 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(applying Strickland); United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir.
2000) (same); United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992)
(citing Strickland).
67. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (“A
convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to
require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components.”).
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that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”68 When the claim is
deprivation of the right to testify truthfully, the defendant loses
almost every time. The court usually finds some or all of the
following: the accused would not have been found credible;69 his
testimony would have been cumulative;70 he would have been
exposed to impeachment with prior convictions;71 the evidence
68. Id. at 694.
69. See, e.g., Morris v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 677 F.3d 1117, 1130 (11th Cir.
2012) (finding that petitioner, a first-degree murderer of an elderly lady, “would
not have been credible”); Alexander v. United States, 219 F. App’x 520, 524 (7th
Cir. 2007) (“It is not reasonably likely that Alexander’s testimony, given his
diminished credibility as a convicted felon, would have swayed the jury’s verdict
in any way.”); United States v. Mullins, 315 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The
difficulty is that a denial by Mullins from the stand would come at a high price.
It would juxtapose a police officer whose account is supported by Mullins’s
signed statement with a felon with a large incentive to lie.”).
70. See, e.g., Morris, 677 F.3d at 1130 (finding that the defendant “would
not have been credible in reasserting his innocence and that his proposed
testimony would have been cumulative,” although the record was “unclear”
about whether counsel told him of his right to testify); Washington v. Kemna, 16
F. App’x 528, 530 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Washington’s testimony at trial would have
merely reiterated the alibi defense already provided through the trial testimony
of his mother, Patricia Washington.”); United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995,
998 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (assuming that defendant would have testified “absent his
counsel’s actions” but finding that his “proposed testimony would have been
largely cumulative and, to the extent it was not cumulative, largely peripheral”).
71. See, e.g., Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2000)
Moreover, [attorney] Egger had very good reason for suggesting that
Dows not testify. Dows had three prior convictions for robbery and
assault, which, in all likelihood, would have been admitted to
impeach Dows on the stand if he had testified . . . . As noted with
some irony by the trial court, if Egger had allowed Dows to testify
under this scenario, that would be definite proof he was suffering
from Alzheimer’s disease. Dows cannot prove deficient performance or
prejudice based upon his failure to testify at trial.
See also Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Medley’s
lawyer recommended that Medley not testify because he would have been
impeached by his prior convictions and statements he made during a lengthy
interview he gave police, which apparently were inconsistent with what Medley
intended to testify.”); Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 983 (7th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (“First, Rodriguez cannot show that his counsel’s advice
concerning the impeachment value of his prior crime was unreasonable.”).
For an example of the analysis under the old, pre-Rock state of the law, see
Hudgins v. United States, 340 F.2d 391, 396 (3d Cir. 1965), in which the Third
Circuit stated:
Any statements made by him in his testimony at the hearing upon
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against him was “overwhelming”;72 or his testimony was weak
and would not have helped.73 Often a court simply passes over the

the motion, had he been permitted to testify, could have been used
against him by way of impeachment at the trial. We regard the
refusal of his counsel, if in fact there was a refusal, to permit him to
testify at the hearing on the motion as an example of good trial tactics
by an attorney versed in the criminal law.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Ailemen, 473 F. App’x 754, 755 (9th Cir.
2012) (“[E]ven if we assume that Ailemen was prevented from testifying by his
attorneys, he has failed to show that he could have overcome the overwhelming
evidence against him.”); Battle v. Sirmons, 304 F. App’x 688, 693 (10th Cir.
2008) (“To counter the overwhelming weight of the evidence presented against
him, Battle argues that his testimony would have explained away all of the
state’s evidence. Even if we entertain Battle’s arguments presented in brief,
which reflect the 20/20 wisdom of hindsight, we cannot find prejudice.”);
Franklin v. United States, 227 F. App’x 856, 857 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Franklin’s
proposed testimony . . . would not have been credible nor would it have refuted
the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Franklin failed to establish prejudice
because there was no reasonable probability that his self-serving testimony
would have convinced the jury to reject the evidence and acquit him.”); Donato
v. United States, No. 98-2991, 208 F.3d 202, at *1–2 (2d Cir. 2000)
Donato wrote the court a letter dated June 16, 1998 stating that “the
defendant never informed defense counsel, that the defendant did not
wish to testify” and that “this decision not to testify was made by
counsel Cohen, and the defendant did not have any decision input on
this matter.” In its decision, the district court was apparently
unaware that Donato had sent this letter, as it found that “Donato
has not answered” the court’s request for his response to Cohen’s
letter. Therefore, when the district judge made a finding of fact that
Cohen’s account was credible, he may have assumed that the issue
was uncontested. Nonetheless, even assuming that there was a
deficient performance by counsel denying Donato his right to testify,
unless Donato’s potential testimony could have established a defense,
he cannot demonstrate prejudice.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 2001)
(finding that the defendant’s “ineffective assistance of counsel claim [was]
without merit”). The court, considering Strickland deficiency, concluded without
discussing the allegation that “counsel interfered with his right to testify,” that
the defendant had “not convincingly argued that his testimony would have
assisted him at either the pretrial hearing or at trial[,]” and that the defendant
did “not even address the viability of the countervailing tactical reasons that his
counsel might have had for declining to call him to the stand.” Id. at 598. This,
in our view, is not supposed to be part of the test.
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question of lawyer deficiency—as Strickland allows it to do74—to
reach a finding of no prejudice.75
A typical case might explain that even though counsel should
not have rested after defendant expressed a wish to “contribute[]
something new and substantive” to his defense, the evidence of
his guilt in “possessing the 8,440 doses of LSD found in the record
album in his house was so strong that there is no reasonable
probability that his testimony would have altered the outcome of
the trial.”76 Dozens of cases have sentences like: “We need not
address whether Lee’s counsel was deficient for failing to call Lee
to testify, because Lee cannot show that he was prejudiced under
Strickland,”77 or “[E]ven if Liriano could establish that her
counsel’s conduct was deficient, she has made no showing of
prejudice.”78 Frequently it is left entirely mysterious what the
actual allegations against the attorney were.79 Was there

74. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (“In particular,
a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies.”).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Ailemen, 473 F. App’x 754, 756 (9th Cir.
2012) (“Further, ‘[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.’”
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697)); United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995,
997 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Although it does not expressly concede that Werdig’s
performance was inadequate, the government does not contest Tavares’s
arguments on this point. The only question before us is whether Tavares was
prejudiced by his counsel’s actions—specifically by Werdig’s failure to ensure
that Tavares had an opportunity to testify.”).
76. Tavares, 100 F.3d at 999.
77. Lee v. Culliver, 300 F. App’x 689, 690 (11th Cir. 2008).
78. United States v. Betancur, 84 F. App’x 131, 135 (2d Cir. 2004). See, e.g.,
Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1997) (“We need not remand for a
finding on this point because, even if Brown’s conclusory allegation raised an
issue on the performance prong of Strickland . . . Brown cannot satisfy the
prejudice prong of the Strickland test.”).
79. See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 335 F. App’x 949, 951–52 (11th Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (containing no discussion of what happened); Battle v.
Sirnons, 304 F. App’x 688, 693 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating “[i]f Battle were
prevented from testifying” but containing no discussion of what happened). It
may be that no hearing or inquiry into the matter was conducted at the district
court level and that these panels simply did not have any specifics in their
record.
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coercion?80 A threat by the lawyer to withdraw if the client
testified?81 An unfulfilled promise to call the defendant?82
But under Strickland’s prejudice prong, it does not matter
that the accused was left in ignorance of his rights, misled, lied
to, or ignored.83 It does not even matter that a defendant was
coerced, threatened, cajoled, or otherwise improperly influenced
into relinquishing his right.84 Such acts go to the deficientperformance prong; they are irrelevant to whether the accused
suffered prejudice. Thus, in United States v. Mullins,85 a lawyer
admitted that her client “repeatedly requested to testify, and that
she ‘prevented’ him from doing so against his wishes.”86 Yet the
court found no prejudice because the defendant’s testimony
“would [have] come at high price” by opening him to
impeachment and because it was doubtful that a felon would be
credited over an officer.87 In Gross v. Knight,88 a lawyer testified,
“I’m sure I just told him it wasn’t going to happen . . . . [It was] a
kind of discussion I’d have with my 9-year-old about whether he’s
going to clean his room.”89 The court could not descry a “better
80. See, e.g., Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[T]o
coerce his client into remaining silent by threatening to abandon him mid-trial
goes beyond the bounds of proper advocacy.”).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 909 F.2d 488, 492 (11th Cir. 1990)
(stating that defense “counsel moved to withdraw shortly after the prosecution
rested its case” and that the trial court assumed that counsel “made the motion
because she discovered that [the defendant] intended to commit perjury”).
82. This was the specific allegation in United States v. Burnell, but what
actually happened between the client and his attorney was left undetermined
because the court found that no prejudice was demonstrated. See United States
v. Burnell, No. 11-8100, 2012 WL 1664124, at *1 (10th Cir. May 14, 2012)
(“Because Mr. Burnell has not made an adequate showing of prejudice, the
district court has not abused its discretion in denying him an evidentiary
hearing on his ineffectiveness claim concerning the right to testify.”).
83. See, e.g., Foster v. Delo, 39 F.3d 873, 883–84 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating
that trial lawyers admitted that they could not recall whether they informed the
defendant that he was permitted to testify at the penalty phase of his capital
trial).
84. See, e.g., Nichols, 953 F.2d at 1553 (stating that the defendant’s
attorney threatened to abandon him mid-trial).
85. United States v. Mullins, 315 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2002).
86. Id. at 455.
87. Id. at 456.
88. Gross v. Knight, 560 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
89. Id. at 670.
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than negligible chance his testimony [as to remorse] would have
resulted in a different outcome,” largely because it would only
have added to a “vast amount of [other] mitigating evidence.”90
Defendants prevail on ineffectiveness claims only in those
exceedingly rare instances where the government’s case is so
weak that the accused’s failure to testify is found actually to
render a result unreliable.91 Nichols v. Butler92 was a “very close”
robbery case in which the only evidence against the defendant
was an eyewitness who glimpsed him briefly.93 The court found
that permitting the defendant to present his account “in his own
words” would have allowed the jury to “weigh his credibility”
against that of the witness.94 In Cannon v. Mullin,95 the “power of
a face-to-face appeal” might have convinced a jury that what the
prosecutor called murder was in fact manslaughter in selfdefense.96 And in Canaan v. McBride,97 an attorney testified that
it never “crossed [his] mind” to call his capital defendant during
the penalty phase even though the testimony “would have been
the only mitigating evidence the jury heard” and “may have

90. Id. at 673.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Lore, 26 F. Supp. 2d 729, 739–40 (D.N.J.
1998) (finding prejudice in counsel’s refusal to permit defendant to testify,
reasoning that the evidence against defendant was weaker than against
codefendants and that defendant could have provided a noncriminal explanation
for the government’s alleged extortionate activity); Campos v. United States,
930 F. Supp. 787, 793–94 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding prejudice in lawyer’s refusal
to allow defendant to testify, noting that testimony could have made a difference
because the government’s case turned almost entirely on the testimony of a DEA
agent); see also United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172, 1178–79 (5th Cir. 1985)
(relying on the notion that the accused, with his knowledge of facts, his
testimony, and his demeanor, is of “prime importance” in a trial in which the
“very point” is to determine guilt); United States v. Irvin, 450 F.2d 968, 971 (9th
Cir. 1971) (Kilkenny, J., dissenting) (“The facial expressions of a witness may
convey much more to the trier of the facts than do the spoken words.”).
92. Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1150 (11th Cir. 1992).
93. See id. at 1551 (“A store employee testified that he glanced at this man
for ‘not even a second.’”).
94. Id. at 1554.
95. Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2004).
96. See id. at 1152 (finding that live testimony from the defendant may
have been more persuasive to the jury than the recorded statement by the
defendant that was offered at trial).
97. Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2005).
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persuaded the jury to be lenient.”98 To summarize the state of the
law, one might say one of two things. At best, defendants have a
right with a very unpromising remedy; at worst, the right to
testify does not exist unless its denial renders the trial unfair.
Defense counsel causes most of these errors. But a trial
court, a statute, or a prosecutor can also infringe the right. Rock
itself involved an Arkansas rule of evidence that excluded
hypnotically refreshed testimony.99 In such circumstances
Strickland makes absolutely no sense.
If a source other than defense counsel causes a violation of
the right to testify, reviewing courts apply a harmless-error
standard,100 or if the defendant failed to object, plain-error
review.101 Trial-court errors include instances where, for instance,
a judge failed to correct an obvious misapprehension on the part
of a pro se defendant who did not know that he had a right to
testify in narrative form.102 Another court erred when it failed to
make inquiry after an attorney stated that his client wished to
remain silent, yet the defendant interrupted, calling the lawyer a
liar and insisting, “I want to take the stand.”103 A court also erred
when it circumscribed a defendant’s planned testimony on motive
by ruling, incorrectly, that aspects of it were irrelevant.104
98. Id. at 385–87.
99. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54–56 (1987) (describing the rule of
evidence that affected defendant’s right to testify and providing a balancing test
to be applied in cases of conflict between a statute and the right to testify).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 248, 248 n.11 (3d Cir.
1998) (reviewing for harmlessness where the district court discouraged the
defendant from testifying by advising him “if my son were on trial here, I would
tell him to follow his lawyer’s advice[,]” and “[i]f I were on trial, I would follow
my lawyer’s advice”).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Lechner, 341 F. App’x 443, 447–48 (10th Cir.
2009) (using a plain-error standard to review the appropriateness of the trial
court telling a defendant who did not object at trial “your failure to testify will
not have any impact on my decision making whatsoever”).
102. See United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir.
2011) (“By not informing Ly that he could testify in narrative form, the district
court denied his right to choose whether to testify ‘knowingly and
intelligently.’”).
103. See Ortega v. O’Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 259–60, 259 n.1 (7th Cir. 1988)
(describing the defendant’s attempts to testify and the trial judge’s failure to
permit the testimony).
104. See United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 194–95 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding
that the court’s failure to provide the defendant with an “opportunity to explain
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Finally, a common court error arises when a judge, concerned
with perjury, discourages a defendant who indicated interest in
testifying.105 A United States Attorney could infringe the right by
engaging in misconduct like threatening a defendant with a
perjury indictment without any basis to suspect an intent to
lie.106 These cases show that using a Strickland analysis in
evaluating a deprivation of the right to testify is misguided—the
right denied is not the right to effective counsel, but the right to
testify. And that right should have the same remedy as the denial
of other constitutional rights.

in his own words” a theory of motive inconsistent with that offered by the
government “infringed upon his constitutional right to put forth a complete
defense”). In Leo, the error did not provide the basis for a new trial because it
was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 195. For a case in which the
defendant’s testimony was found irrelevant, see United States v. Fazio, 487 F.3d
646, 656–57 (8th Cir. 2007).
In United States v. Canty, a defendant was charged with counterfeiting.
United States v. Canty, 499 F.3d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 2007). He wished to testify
that his intent was to use the bills to help the police make drug busts. Id. The
Government argued this was in fact a public-authority defense, which under the
rules required advance notice to them. Id. The trial court restricted Canty’s
testimony on his intent. Id. The circuit court found that this restriction was an
error because Canty had never actually claimed he was ordered to print the fake
money by police. Id. at 732. However odd or improbable Canty’s scheme, he
should have been allowed to put it before the jury. Id. Failure to do so was error
and it was not harmless. Id. at 734.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 909 F.2d 488, 492 (11th Cir. 1990)
(determining that the trial court erred in telling the defendant that he could
keep his current lawyer or proceed pro se, forcing him to choose between the
right to testify and the right to counsel). The court forced the defendant to make
that choice after assuming that the defense lawyer’s motion to withdraw was
occasioned by the concern that the defendant would commit perjury. Id. at 492
n.3.
106. See United States v. Davis, 974 F.2d 182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(describing a prosecutor’s request that the court “instruct Davis about the
possibilities and penalties of a perjury charge were he to take the stand and
lie”). And this, too, incidentally, is not structural error. See United States v.
Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 372 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (noting that the
defendant must prove “substantial prejudice” to obtain a reversal of conviction
on the grounds that the prosecutor deprived him of defense testimony by
threatening a witness).
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B. The Inconsistency Between the Autonomy-Based Right to
Testify and Strickland’s Purpose of Ensuring “Reliability”
of Trial Results
The problem is that Strickland’s concern is with whether a
lawyer’s incompetence was so egregious that the “trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.”107 By contrast,
“personal” rights, like taking the stand, involve a defendant’s
autonomy, his day in court, the right to meet his accusers
himself, the chance to participate in settling his own legal fate,
and the notion (as Justice Frankfurter wrote) that the “most
persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as
the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for
himself.”108 These considerations, under this “free choice” line,
hold even if a defendant’s election—like the choice to proceed pro
se—is an ill-advised one that makes an unreliable conviction
more likely. Courts consider an adverse result to be fair because
the accused, so long as his lawyer has reasoned with him about
the perils, alone bears the consequences of his choice.109 It is an
irony that a right in which outcome is irrelevant is reviewed
under a test that focuses on outcome.
Strickland’s inquiry asks whether a lawyer fails his client,
yet suppressing a clear constitutional right seems ipso facto
failure.110 Strickland requires us to “indulge a strong
107. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); see also Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993) (explaining that the Strickland inquiry asks
whether the “result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable”).
108. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (plurality opinion)
(Frankfurter, J.).
109. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (“The defendant, and
not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction”
and so his choices regarding his defense, even if “ultimately to his own
detriment[,] . . . must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is
the lifeblood of the law.’”).
110. Theoretically, Strickland might remain appropriate in true
ineffectiveness cases: say, a defendant claims counsel was deficient in failing to
inform him of his right to testify. See Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d 874, 882 (4th
Cir. 1998) (“Because the burden of ensuring that a criminal defendant is
informed of the nature and existence of the right to testify rests upon trial
counsel, the burden shouldered by trial counsel is a component of effective
assistance of counsel.”); see also Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 397 (3d Cir.
2010) (“[E]very authority we are aware of that has addressed the matter of
counsel’s failure to advise a client of the right to testify has done so under
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presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance,”111 but can a lawyer make a
valid choice to violate his client’s prerogative?112 Strickland
demands that the defendant “overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be
considered sound trial strategy,’”113 yet what of pronouncements
that the decision to testify is never merely a matter of strategy
but always a matter of personal right?114 Clearly there is tension
Strickland’s two-prong framework.”). Or when a defendant claims counsel was
deficient in telling him that the court will not let him testify. See United States
v. Hubbard, 638 F.3d 866, 868–70 (8th Cir. 2011) (evaluating an ineffectiveness
claim where defense counsel told defendant that the district court would not
permit defendant to testify in his own defense). Or when a defendant claims
counsel was deficient in failing to seek a stay to allow an ill defendant to testify
upon recovery. See United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995, 996–97 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (“Tavares argues that his counsel’s failure to take appropriate measures
in light of his health problems effectively deprived him of his right to testify.”).
Or when a defendant claims counsel was deficient in advising him to testify but
neglecting to prepare him adequately or misjudging its scope. See United States
v. Smith, 421 F. App’x 889, 898–99 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Together, Smith contends,
these shortcomings contributed to her decision to give limited testimony at trial,
led to the government’s allegedly damaging cross-examination, and prejudiced
her defense.”). Or when a defendant claims counsel was deficient in failing to
explain that whether to testify is ultimately the defendant’s decision. See United
States v. Herschberger, No. 90-3237, 1991 WL 136337, at *3 (10th Cir. July 24,
1991) (stating that the defendant asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim “that his counsel failed to advise him he had the right to decide whether
he would testify”). But our view is that, for purposes of doctrinal clarity and
consistency, such allegations of error ought to be considered together with
actual coercion cases and with purported violations by a court, a prosecutor, or a
statute, under an independent, freestanding right-to-testify analysis.
111. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
112. In the words of Judge J. Skelly Wright, sitting as a district judge in Poe
v. United States:
The right to testify is personal to the accused. He must make the
ultimate decision on whether or not to take the stand. In this regard
it is unlike other decisions, which are often called “trial decisions,”
where it is counsel who decides whether to cross examine a particular
witness or introduce a particular document. Here it is the accused
who must decide and it is the duty of counsel to present to him the
relevant information on which he may make an intelligent decision.
Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1964), aff’d, 352 F.2d 639
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
113. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation omitted).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984)
(“We hold that a defendant’s personal constitutional right to testify truthfully in
his own behalf may not be waived by counsel as a matter of trial strategy.”).
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between concessions that a defendant may choose to testify,
“however irrational that insistence might be,”115 and denial of
relief because that testimony “would [have] come at a high
price.”116 Strickland is concerned with ensuring an “adversarial
process,” but our scenario involves relations between attorney
and client, not attorney and attorney.117 Finally, there is a poor fit
between Strickland’s concern with the “justice of the finding of
guilt” and the Faretta–Rock concern with the propriety of the
mode by which guilt is found.118 The right to choose to testify is
akin to the right to choose counsel, which under Gonzalez-Lopez
endures regardless of how effective—or ineffective—one’s
preferred lawyer may prove.119
Powell v. Alabama,120 the famous Scottsboro Boys case from
1932, in which the lawyer did not interview his nine capital
defendants until hours before the trial,121 is the patron saint of
Assistance of Counsel Clause decisions. Justice Sutherland wrote
a stirring tribute to the “guiding hand” of a defense lawyer.122 But
the problem in coercive right-to-testify cases—the reason it is not
a Strickland matter—is not too little but too much counsel, a
guiding hand that has become overmastering. When this
happens, as in Faretta, “in a very real sense, it is not his
defense.”123 The right to self-representation, unlike the right to
testify, is exercised only while unrepresented, but a clientthwarting lawyer can still become, like an unwanted lawyer, “an
115. Id.
116. United States v. Mullins, 315 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir. 2002).
117. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (asserting that
when evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, “appropriate inquiry focuses on the
adversarial process, not on the accused’s relationship with his lawyer as such”).
118. For the phrase “justice of the finding of guilt” see United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976), the case from which Strickland purported to
take its “prejudice” test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see
also infra note 267.
119. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006) (finding
that the defendant was erroneously deprived of his right to choice of counsel
when the court prevented him from “being represented by the lawyer he
want[ed], regardless of the quality of the representation he received”).
120. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
121. See id. at 52–58 (describing the factual circumstances relating to the
appointment of counsel for the defendants).
122. See id. at 68–69 (describing the importance of the right to counsel).
123. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).
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organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant
and his right to defend himself personally.”124
Thus, we have a constitutional right without a remedy. If a
defendant is intimidated, pressured, or tricked by his lawyer into
remaining seated—a typical threat is to withdraw midtrial—the
defendant is all the same denied relief unless he can show that
his testimony would have had decisive, but-for evidentiary effect,
even though the right is not supposed to turn on evidence but
autonomy. To that extent, he is denied his full opportunity to be
heard, which the Supreme Court has never hesitated to call the
“fundamental requisite of due process.”125
C. The Ethical Consideration
A lawyer is required to exercise most rights on the client’s
behalf. A lawyer is also required to stand down if the client
decides, contrary to his advice, to testify. Model Rule of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a)126 says: “In a criminal case, the
lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial
and whether the client will testify.”127 To be sure, the Supreme
Court reminds us that the “Constitution does not codify the
124. Id. at 820.
125. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 395 (1914); see also California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (stating that the Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense”);
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979) (stating that it is “axiomatic” that
“a person cannot incur the loss of liberty for an offense without notice and a
meaningful opportunity to defend”). This basic principle of legality sweeps well
beyond the criminal context. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973)
(probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole
revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970) (welfare recipient
facing termination of assistance).
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012).
127. Id. (emphasis added). See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) (“If the lawyer does not offer the
client’s testimony and, on inquiry by the court into whether the client has been
fully advised [of his] right to testify, the client states a desire to testify . . . the
lawyer may have no other choice than to disclose . . . the client’s intention to
testify falsely.”); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-5.2(a) (3d
ed. 1993) (listing “whether to testify in his or her own behalf” among the
“decisions relating to the conduct of the case . . . ultimately for the accused”).
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ABA’s Model Rules,”128 but, with equal sureness, it tells us that
the judiciary has an “independent interest in ensuring that
criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the
profession.”129 Mild reproof is often the sole consequence of a
lawyer’s right-to-testify violation.130 Counsel must advise on
exercise of the right—and the line between advice and coercion is
a question of fact on which many right-to-testify cases turn.131
III. Is a Violation of the Right to Testify a “Structural” Error?132
Arizona v. Fulminante133 reaffirmed the rule that “most
constitutional errors can be harmless.”134 The varieties of
harmless error are legion,135 and they even include errors that
128. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 790 (2009).
129. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988).
130. See, e.g., Jiles v. United States, 72 F. App’x 493, 493 (7th Cir. 2003) (“If
counsel actually said this, it is inexcusable behavior that likewise has the
potential to establish prejudice for purposes of Strickland.”).
131. See, e.g., Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 52–53 (1st Cir. 1993)
(describing the principles guiding courts in drawing the “difficult line” between
“earnest counseling and over coercion”).
132. In Part III we discuss four categories largely of our devising. There is
probably a fifth category for judgments rendered by tribunals without
jurisdiction, which is irrelevant here. See Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69,
71 (2003) (determining that a Ninth Circuit panel comprised of two Article III
judges and one Article IV judge from the Northern Mariana Islands did not have
the authority to decide the appeal); Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 472 (1974)
(concluding that the habeas corpus statute requires district courts, not
magistrate judges alone, to conduct evidentiary habeas hearings); United States
v. Amer.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 685–86 (1960) (concluding that
retired circuit judges were ineligible to participate in the decision of a case on
rehearing en banc).
133. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
134. Id. at 306.
135. There are probably hundreds of examples. See, e.g., Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–15 (1999) (failure to charge jury on materiality element in
tax-fraud prosecution subject to harmless-error review); Pope v. Illinois, 481
U.S. 497, 501 (1987) (misstatement of element of offense subject to harmlesserror review); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 503–05 (1983) (improper
comment on defendant’s silence at trial subject to harmless-error review); Moore
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (admission of identification obtained in
violation of right to counsel subject to harmless-error review); Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250, 252 (1969) (admission of nontestifying codefendant’s
statement subject to harmless-error review).
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cripple the presentation of a defense. For example, in Crane v.
Kentucky,136 a defendant sought to introduce testimony attacking
the credibility of his confession, a move the judge erroneously
blocked as an attempt to relitigate a suppression motion.137 In
Delaware v. Van Arsdall,138 a judge improperly prevented the
accused from impeaching a government witness over his alleged
dealmaking with the prosecution.139 These errors, the Court
wrote in Fulminante, were subject to harmless-error analysis
because they involved “trial error” that “occurred during the
presentation of the case to the jury” and so could be
“quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence
presented in order to determine whether its admission [was]
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”140 Under that definition of
trial error, the Court in Fulminante used harmless-error review
in evaluating the admission of a coerced confession.141 By
contrast, said the Court, “structural” errors occur when the
“entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously
affected” by the errors and so “defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’
standards.”142
The inquiry into whether an error is structural really turns
on the nature of the right and the effect of the error. The main
complication is that the right to testify has two natures: first, as
recognition of the defendant’s dignity, and second, as a means for
him to strive for an acquittal. With respect to dignity,
suppression is the error and only reversal can remedy it. But with
respect to acquittal, the denial of the right is a reversible error
only if the denial diminished his chance of acquittal; if it would
not have helped in the end, there is nothing for a reviewing court

136. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
137. See id. at 690–91 (“Under these principles, the Kentucky courts erred in
foreclosing petitioner’s efforts to introduce testimony about the environment in
which the police secured his confession.”).
138. Delaware v. Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
139. See id. at 675–77 (describing the court’s failure to permit defense
counsel to impeach a government witness during cross-examination).
140. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–08 (1991).
141. See id. at 307–09 (analyzing precedent and determining that harmlesserror review was appropriate).
142. Id. at 309–10.
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to do. No circuit court has held that a right-to-testify error is
structural,143 yet some seem to consider the question open.144
A. Structural Because Unassessable?
Errors are structural for different reasons. Probably the most
common reason is the difficulty of assessing the error’s effect.145
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez a defendant was denied
counsel of choice.146 The Court found the harmless-error and
Strickland tests inapposite because they concern “identifiable
mistakes” that judges can “assess” as they bear on the
“outcome.”147 But to assess a wrongful denial of choice of counsel,
judges would need to speculate on the probable acts of the
143. See, e.g., United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995, 997–98 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (describing the standard for reviewing defense counsel’s failure to permit
defendant to testify and citing cases that support the court’s choice of standard).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Martinez, 677 F.3d 699, 712 n.8 (5th
Cir. 2012) (arguing that “the right to testify is a constitutional right so basic to a
fair trial that its infraction can never be treated as harmless error” yet stating
that the Court “need not decide this question” (emphasis added)); see also
Barrow v. Uchtman, 398 F.3d 597, 608 n.12 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
It is an interesting question whether defendant’s forfeiture of his
constitutional right to testify, standing alone, is sufficiently
“prejudicial” to warrant reversal of a conviction, or whether the
decision not to testify—even when based on erroneous legal advice—
is not prejudicial unless it actually affects the outcome of the trial.
Seventh Circuit precedent seems to support the latter view that
defendants who allege they waived their right to testify still must
show that this waiver was prejudicial, i.e., that the failure to testify
affected the outcome of the trial.
145. We cite some better-known cases below, but there are others. In Stirone
v. United States, a judge in a Hobbs Act case permitted a defendant to be tried
on a charge not made in the indictment. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212,
214 (1960). The Court stated that this error could never be harmless because
“we cannot know whether the grand jury would have included [the added
charge] in its indictment,” and yet “this might have been the basis upon which
the trial jury convicted petitioner.” Id. at 219. In Ballard v. United States,
violation of a statutory scheme resulted in an all-male jury panel. Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946). The Court considered the “subtle
interplay of influence[s]” that women have on men, and men on women, to be
“among the imponderables,” and reversed without any examination of prejudice.
Id. at 193, 195–96.
146. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006)
(discussing the trial court’s limitations on defendant’s choice of counsel).
147. Id. at 150–51.
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rejected counsel—from his relations with prosecutors to crossexamination questions to courtroom style.148 In Holloway v.
Arkansas,149 the Court found that unconstitutional multiple
representation was not subject to harmless-error analysis
because “to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the
attorney’s options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations
would be virtually impossible.”150 In Waller v. Georgia,151 the
Court held that the violation of the public-trial guarantee was not
reviewable for harmless error152 because the “benefits of a public
trial are frequently intangible, difficult to prove, or a matter of
chance.”153 In Vasquez v. Hillery,154 the Court held that when
black citizens are “systemically excluded” from grand-jury
service, the error is not “amenable” to harmless-error review
because the “effect of the violation cannot be ascertained.”155 In
Price v. Georgia,156 a state court reversed a manslaughter
conviction because of an erroneous jury instruction,157 but the
Court prohibited retrial on the original murder charge because it
could not “determine whether or not the murder charge against
petitioner induced the jury to find him guilty of the less serious
offense of voluntary manslaughter rather than to continue to
debate his innocence.”158 In Gray v. Mississippi,159 the Court
rejected the argument that an improper for-cause exclusion of a
prospective juror reluctant to impose the death penalty could be
harmless, even when a prosecutor would otherwise have
exercised a peremptory challenge, for “we cannot know whether
148. Id.
149. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
150. Id. at 491.
151. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
152. Id. at 49.
153. Id. at 49 n.9.
154. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
155. Id. at 263–64; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86–87 (1986)
(reviewing the effects of racial discrimination in jury selection not only on the
accused but also on society, the public’s impression of the court’s competence,
and the excluded juror).
156. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
157. Id. at 324.
158. Id. at 331.
159. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
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in fact he would have had this peremptory challenge left to
use.”160 And in Sullivan v. Louisiana,161 the Court found that an
erroneous instruction on reasonable doubt could never be
harmless because the consequences were “necessarily
unquantifiable and indeterminable.”162
Does the unassessability rationale apply in the right-totestify context?163 Courts do identify the “special significance”
that a defendant’s testimony can have, considering the “power of
a face-to-face appeal”164 and “inherent significance” of his word.165
The dissenters in Foster v. Delo,166 for instance, felt that the
160. Id. at 664–65. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (holding
that a death sentence “cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or
recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because
they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or
religious scruples against its infliction”).
161. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
162. Id. at 281–82.
163. Other mainstays of due process jurisprudence certainly partake of this
unassessability rationale but are better discussed under different subheadings
below. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in
criminal cases); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (biased judge).
164. See, e.g., Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1172 (10th Cir. 2004) (“We
are also cognizant of the power of a face-to-face appeal . . . . Mr. Cannon’s
testimony, and his demeanor while testifying, could have special significance to
the jury on this matter.”). In addition, a defendant’s testimony allows the jury to
assess the defendant’s physiognomy and demeanor. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504
U.S. 127, 137–38 (1992) (reversing a conviction after the accused had been
forcibly medicated with antipsychotics during trial—in part because medication
could have “effects” on his “outward appearance” that “cannot be shown from a
trial transcript”). In Sell v. United States, the Court noted that involuntary
medications can “diminish the ability to express emotions” at trial, which can
“undermine” its fairness. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 185–86 (2003).
There are also cases teaching that elements of appearance in the form of
clothing—like, presumably, elements of appearance in facial expressions—can
have consequences not capturable by a transcript. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams,
425 U.S. 501, 504–05 (1976) (forced wearing of prison clothing); Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (binding and gagging accused during trial).
165. See, e.g., Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The
testimony of a criminal defendant at his own trial is unique and inherently
significant.”); United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172, 1178–79 (5th Cir. 1985)
(stating that the accused, with his knowledge of facts, his testimony, and his
demeanor, is of “prime importance” at trial); United Sates v. Irvin, 450 F.2d 968,
971 (9th Cir. 1971) (Kilkenny, J., dissenting) (“The facial expressions of a
witness may convey much more to the trier of the facts than do the spoken
words.”).
166. Foster v. Delo, 39 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1994).
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accused’s testimony could have been decisive against a prosecutor
who “dehumanized” the defendant by labeling him a “that”—as in
“that (indicating) is no man.”167 There is a sense in which the
force of ungiven testimony is immeasurable.168 It goes beyond the
substance of his testimony, but rather is a matter of a willingness
to speak directly to those judging you, to refuse to hide behind the
Fifth Amendment, to put on display any emotion that testifying
arouses, whether a tremble in the voice of one falsely accused or
the manufactured confidence of one seeking to lie his way out of
guilt.
The elusive effect of all this is hardly captured by words on a
page. This sort of evidence is of a quality different from other
types that a defendant might present. Testimony from the
individual at the heart of events is uncommonly probative.
Confessions—another form of defendant testimony—may be the
“most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted
against him.”169 They “come from the actor himself, the most
knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about
his past conduct” and have such a “profound impact on the jury”
167. Id. at 885–86 (Bright, J., dissenting).
168. See Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1081 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting)
[T]he right to testify resembles other rights recognized as requiring
automatic reversal because it is impossible, and perhaps improper, to
attempt to judge the effect that the defendant’s appearance on the
stand would have had on the jury . . . . Judges can, with a reasonable
degree of assurance, identify and sort out merely trivial or cumulative
evidence and form a reasoned judgment on possible impact upon the
jury of what it erroneously heard or failed to hear. There is a degree
of speculation, but the risk is acceptable. Where the error is in
keeping the defendant from the stand the judge can consider the
content of what the defendant might have said the same as for a
nonparty witness. But he cannot weigh the possible impact upon the
jury of factors such as the defendant’s willingness to mount the stand
rather than avail himself of the shelter of the Fifth Amendment, his
candor and courtesy (or lack of them), his persuasiveness, his respect
for court processes. These are elusive and subjective factors, even
among persons who might perceive and hear the defendant, but more
significantly, they are matters neither communicated to an appellate
judge nor susceptible of communication to him. Appellate attempts to
appraise impact upon the jury of such unknown and unknowable
matters is purely speculative.
169. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139–40 (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting).
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that we “may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind
even if told to do so.”170 If a defendant’s testimony can doom him
in compelled-confession cases, why might not it save him in rightto-testify cases?
On the other hand, the unadmitted testimony can almost
always be described later in hearings and affidavits (e.g., “I would
have said this, to establish that”) and at that point it can be
weighed alongside the rest of the record.171 If Fulminante holds
that the erroneous admission of a defendant’s testimonial
statement can be harmless,172 why should the erroneous exclusion
of testimony require reversal? Compelled testimony, too, is a
matter of the gravest dignity, volition, and fairness. Fulminante
suggests that, if the criterion is assessability of the error’s effect,
the denial of the right to testify is a trial error.173 The accused in
170. Id.
171. But this is not permitted in all circumstances. In Luce v. United States,
the Court held that to preserve a claim of improper impeachment with a prior
conviction under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a), a defendant must testify—otherwise a
court cannot assess harmlessness. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 n.5
(1984). Thus, a defendant could not use an offer of proof on appeal as a way to
allow an evaluation of harmlessness.
172. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (“When reviewing
the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession, the appellate court, as it
does with the admission of other forms of improperly admitted evidence, simply
reviews the remainder of the evidence against the defendant to determine
whether the admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.”).
173. One could argue that Gonzalez-Lopez supports the proposition that
right-to-testify errors are structural. Under its rule, the dissent observed, a
“defendant who is erroneously required to go to trial with a second-choice
attorney is automatically entitled to a new trial even if this attorney performed
brilliantly.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 160 (2006) (Alito, J.,
dissenting). The majority required the stringent remedy because of the
unassessability of what might have been, see id. at 150 (majority opinion) (“We
have little trouble concluding that erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel
of choice . . . unquestionably qualifies as ‘structural error. . . .’ It is impossible to
know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to
quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the
proceedings.”), but why does it even matter that a defendant gets his counsel of
choice? It seems linked to autonomy. Certainly Justice Scalia made clear it was
not merely about a fair trial. See id. at 146 (“In sum, the right at stake here is
the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that right was
violated because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous.”). Nonetheless,
because the Court did not invoke that rationale, and in fact labeled it a different
“criterion” for finding structural error, id. at 149 n.4, our reliance is hesitant.
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the right-to-testify context, unlike a Faretta defendant,174 does
not get an entirely different proceeding as a result of the error,
but rather a trial that is simply missing a piece of evidence—an
important piece, but one that can be ascertained post-trial.
Gonzalez-Lopez explained that we cannot know what the lawyerwho-might-have-been would have done at trial;175 similarly, we
cannot know how a Faretta defendant might have acquitted
himself. But where the defendant is prohibited from testifying, no
alternate universe of possibility has been cut off. And this, under
this particular line of structural-error precedent, seems to make
all the difference.
B. Structural Because Risk of Prejudice Too Great?
A second rationale for structural error, especially in
prejudicial-publicity cases,176 appears when there is “such a
probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently
lacking in due process.”177 The concern is that a pervasive,
insinuating press is likely (even if undetectably) to erode juror
objectivity.178 Or, in Tumey v. Ohio,179 the Court invalidated a
procedure whereby a judge, the village mayor, received fees and
174. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835–36 (1975) (vacating the
judgment and remanding Faretta’s case for new proceedings after Faretta was
forced to accept appointed counsel despite requests to represent himself).
175. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006)
(describing the Court’s inability to determine how a different lawyer would have
handled a case and the impact those decisions might have had on the outcome of
the proceedings).
176. See generally Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (concluding that the
defendant was deprived of due process by the televising of his criminal trial);
Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (finding that defendant was denied right to
an impartial jury due to extensive media coverage of the case in months prior to
the trial); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353–58 (1966) (describing
the courtroom as a “carnival atmosphere” and the press’ impact on jurors who
became “celebrities,” subject to months of skewed press coverage urging death
penalty).
177. Estes, 381 U.S. at 542–43.
178. See id. at 545 (noting that it is “highly probable” that invasive press
coverage “will have a direct bearing on [a juror’s] vote as to guilt or innocence”
due to the juror feeling “the pressures of knowing that friends and neighbors
have their eyes upon them”).
179. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).

132

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 95 (2013)

costs upon convictions but not acquittals;180 this would “offer a
possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the
burden of proof.”181 But the impartiality concerns that justify
structural-error analysis in these cases do not relate to the
autonomy concerns underlying the right to testify.
C. Structural Because Harm at Trial Irrelevant?
A third rationale is the “irrelevance of harmlessness.”182 This
is the reason why Faretta errors are structural. In McKaskle v.
Wiggins,183 the Supreme Court said: “Since the right of selfrepresentation is a right that when exercised usually increases
the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its
denial is not amenable to ‘harmless error’ analysis. The right is
either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.”184
In Johnstone v. Kelly,185 defendant Johnstone wanted to
represent himself, yet the trial court appointed counsel.186 This
ruling was reversed.187 On retrial, the judge told Johnstone he
had to go pro se—as he had demanded.188 But the circuit court
rejected the argument that Johnstone could not make a fresh
election this time around: the trial court’s error was that it
“denied him the choice whether to have counsel or proceed pro se.
It is that choice that must be accorded at a retrial.”189
If Rock v. Arkansas declared the right to testify “[e]ven more
fundamental to a personal defense” than the right of selfrepresentation,190 would not the right to testify, logically, be in
180. Id. at 520.
181. Id. at 532.
182. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148–49, 149 n.4. (2006).
183. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
184. Id. at 177 n.8.
185. Johnstone v. Kelly, 808 F.2d. 214 (2d Cir. 1986).
186. Id. at 215–16.
187. Id. at 218.
188. See Johnstone v. Kelly, 812 F.2d 821, 821 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing the
State’s argument that it could “satisfy its obligation to [the defendant] by
affording him a retrial at which he would be required to represent himself”
(emphasis added)).
189. Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
190. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).
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the structural class? Judge Godbold made the argument in his
dissent in Wright v. Estelle: “[w]hen personal rights are involved,
the harmless error rule does not apply because we are not
concerned with the ‘ultimate consequences’ of trial, but with
preventing the individual from being overcome by the criminal
process.”191 Is this right?192 If a defendant was silenced, but would
have testified only on some entirely peripheral point, must this
require retrial? In one sense, the error would not “affect” his
“substantial rights,” which obligates courts to ignore it.193 On the
other hand, if the right is simply to be able to choose to testify
truthfully, no matter how significant the testimony might be as a
piece of evidence, a violation eliminates the right. The answer
hinges on what you believe to be the particular harm being
reviewed for harmlessness: if the wrong is the denial of choice,
error is never harmless; if the wrong is impairing a defense as it
affects a jury’s verdict, error here could very well be harmless.
191. Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1081 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the harmless-error rule is inapplicable to doublejeopardy analysis (citing Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970))). Judge
Reinhardt made the argument in his dissent in United States v. Martinez. See
generally United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991). He argued: (1) because the
Chapman inquiry “involves delicate judgments about fact specific situations,
errors that have an indeterminate impact upon the appellate record cannot be
harmless” and (2) “harmless error analysis, designed to insure correct outcomes,
is essentially irrelevant to a panoply of constitutional rights that protect
individual dignity.” Id. at 770 n.23. Many a petitioner has echoed this argument;
all have been met with rejection. See, e.g., Skeens v. Haskins, 4 F. App’x 236,
238 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Skeens’s argument that his championed error was
‘structural error’ is without merit. Most errors do not automatically render a
trial unfair and thus, can be harmless.” (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 306 (1991))).
192. The Supreme Court reiterated in 2006 that “[o]nly in rare cases” should
an error be deemed “structural, and thus requir[ing] automatic reversal.”
Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218 (2006). A good example of structural
error occurred in Gomez v. United States: a magistrate judge, exceeding his
statutory power, picked a jury in a felony trial without meaningful district court
review; the Court said there would be no harmless-error analysis. Gomez v.
United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989).
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006) (“On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the
record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (defining harmless error as “[a]ny
error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights
must be disregarded”).
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D. Structural Because Procedurally Intolerable?

Sometimes the Court refuses to consider harmlessness
because the right is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial.”194
These include the rights to counsel in criminal cases (Gideon v.
Wainwright);195 to trial in serious criminal cases (Duncan v.
Louisiana);196 and to have appointed counsel prosecute certain
meritorious appeals (Anders v. California).197 These holdings
invoke some of the rationales already described, but the thrust is
that in such cases the problem is not merely a reliable conviction
but “fair procedure”198 and preventing an individual from simply
being hustled through the system. It is not just an evidentiary
matter or a concern about just outcomes but a problem with
means.199 It is no rhetorical excess to say that we adhere to forms
of procedure, for their own sake, almost religiously, because those
procedures work to minimize discretion and safeguard justice and
because that is just how we do things in this country.
The rationale of procedural impermissibility may apply here
in that a silenced defendant has had a right withdrawn from
him—regardless of whether he faced overwhelming evidence or
wished to say things that would have angered jurors and
provoked a more severe sentence. Like a man who is forced to
plead guilty, he is wronged in a way independent of concerns
about accuracy of result. He is wronged like a convict who is
denied a right to allocute, though he could hardly have swayed a
judge. Or like a man who sought jury trial but got a bench trial,
though clearly he would have been convicted under either fact194. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
195. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
196. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
197. See generally Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
198. See id. at 741 (“We have concluded that California’s action does not
comport with fair procedure and lacks that equality that is required by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
199. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206–07 (1960) (explaining
that the accused’s guilt or innocence is not the only consideration in a
proceeding and noting that “important human values are sacrificed” when the
government is permitted to use unfair procedures to secure a conviction); see
also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959) (noting that “in the end
life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict
those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves”).
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finder. These are simply choices a man facing the State has. On
this theory, the question that most federal courts ask when a
defendant claims his right to testify was abridged—Did it matter
in the end?—is the wrong one. The proper question is: Was this
an invalid proceeding? Is gagging a man at this dramatic
crossroad in his life very different from trying him in absentia?
It comes down to how one reads this sentence from
Fulminante:
[T]he harmless error doctrine is essential to preserve the
“principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to
decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or
innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal
process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial
rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial
error.”200

So are we talking here about the factual question of guilt? Or
underlying fairness? Or both? Or autonomy? We know trial
fairness is not the sum of things. In Lafler v. Cooper,201 the
Supreme Court said that when pleas are mishandled by defense
counsel, the issue was not the “fairness or reliability of the trial
but the fairness and regularity of the processes that preceded
it.”202 Even if the trial reaches an accurate result, there remains a
sense that a wrong was done which requires its own remedy. This
is why, under Hamilton v. Alabama,203 we “do not stop to
determine whether prejudice resulted”204 to a defendant left to
face arraignment without a lawyer—even if it can be shown that
the lack of counsel had no effect whatsoever on the trial.205 In
Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court similarly declared that the “right to

200. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991) (quoting Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
201. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
202. Id. at 1388.
203. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
204. Id. at 55.
205. See id. (“When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel,
we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted. . . . [T]he degree of
prejudice can never be known. Only the presence of counsel could have enabled
this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead
intelligently.”).
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select counsel of one’s choice” has “never been derived from the
Sixth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring a fair trial.”206
This is a difficult question. On the one hand, there is
doubtless precedent to support the notion that the right to testify
truthfully, bound up with the notion of not treating a man as a
voiceless object to be disposed of by lawyers, demands reversal to
remedy error.207 It is a question of process, not evidentiary
weight.208 At the same time, other precedent suggests that this
right, despite its uncontested importance, is still at bottom a trial

206. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006). There is
something of a tension, however, with the choice rationale and Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). In Wheat, Chief Justice Rehnquist (who dissented in
Faretta) wrote that the right to counsel exists to ensure that a man does not get
railroaded by the State. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 158–59 (asserting that the right
to counsel exists to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial and
noting that “an unaided layman may have little skill in arguing the law or in
coping with an intricate procedural system”). Once that guarantee is enforced,
the defendant has some latitude in choice, but a fair trial is always the main
thing. Id. A bigger problem is that Wheat rejects the argument that a man
should have his lawyer of choice and that if his lawyer has a conflict of interest,
it is simply the client’s choice to waive. See id. at 164 (“The District Court must
recognize a presumption in favor of petitioner’s counsel of choice, but that
presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but
by a showing of a serious potential for conflict.”). Chief Justice Rehnquist said
that courts have an independent interest in ethical standards and in trials with
the appearance of integrity. See id. at 160 (“Federal courts have an independent
interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical
standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who
observe them.”). Perhaps this represents a shift away from autonomy, but in
any event our situation is still nearer to Faretta than Wheat. Faretta, like the
right to testify, concerns what a man whose liberty is at stake may do for
himself. Wheat involves what one is allowed to have another man do on one’s
behalf. Perhaps Gonzalez-Lopez shifted us back toward choice. Justice Scalia,
speaking of Wheat, wrote: “It is one thing to conclude that the right to counsel of
choice may be limited by the need for fair trial, but quite another to say that the
right does not exist unless its denial renders the trial unfair.” Gonzalez-Lopez,
548 U.S. at 147 n.3. Besides, if courts have an interest in ethical standards, one
worthy way to uphold these standards would be to properly remedy the
unethical misconduct of defense lawyers who prevent their clients from
testifying.
207. See, e.g., Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1081 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc) (Godbold, J., dissenting) (stating that “the right to testify resembles other
rights recognized as requiring automatic reversal”).
208. See id. at 1075 (stating the belief “that the federal constitution now
requires state and federal courts to allow a defendant to testify” and that
“[m]ost often the right is treated as part of due process”).
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right.209 It allows an accused to proffer evidence to attempt to
exonerate himself. A chance at trial victory is why the common
law disability was lifted. It is why defendants speak. It is why
they complain about denials of the right. And this right can only
be exercised at trial. If testimony cannot under any
circumstances have secured a defendant an acquittal, a new trial
would be futile.
But we reason as follows: the right to testify derives in part
from the Fifth Amendment. It mirrors the right against
compelled self-incrimination; so said the Court in Rock when it
called the right to testify the “necessary corollary” of the right to
remain silent.210 And there seems no logical reason to protect the
right against forced speech more than the right against forced
silence: compulsion to testify to your detriment is just as bad as
compulsion against testifying to your benefit.211 Yet Fulminante
commands that a Fifth Amendment violation, even one involving

209. See, e.g., United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th
Cir. 2011) (characterizing the right to testify as a “fundamental trial right[]”).
210. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52–53 (1987).
211. Of course, the exercise of one right waives the other. If anything, it
seems safer to presume that the right to silence is the default preference. See
Harvey v. Shillinger, 76 F.3d 1528, 1535 (10th Cir. 1996) (“A defendant’s choice
to exercise his right to allocution, like the choice to exercise the right to testify,
is entirely his own . . . . Once a defendant chooses to testify . . . he waives his
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.”); United States v. Pennycooke,
65 F.3d 9, 11 (3d. Cir. 1995) (noting that “[e]xercise of either the right to testify
or the right not to testify necessarily would waive the other right” and
cautioning that a court’s advice regarding the right to testify could
inappropriately influence a defendant to waive his or her right to remain silent).
Another interesting problem is how a pro se defendant testifies. See
generally United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1989). In Nivica, the
examination began and ended thus:
MR. WELLINGTON: The question is: Does Mark Pedley Wellington,
a/k/a Jack Williams, have anything to hide?
The answer is No.
[PROSECUTOR]: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained. Please strike the answer. Please wait until
an objection is made, if any is made, before you answer.
MR. WELLINGTON: Well, I guess I can’t ask myself any more
questions then.
THE COURT: Thank you. You are excused.
Id. at 1120.
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actual coercion, does not mean automatic reversal.212 A violation
of the right to testify, even one involving suppression, likewise
should not bring on instant reversal.213 Both errors may involve
egregious tramplings on fundamental rights, but both errors
occur within a larger record that allows a court to reconstruct the
probable result had no mistakes been made. The right to testify
emanates from the Compulsory Process Clause214: a defendant
may almost always call witnesses, including himself.215
Washington v. Texas216 declared that the “right to present the
defendant’s version of the facts” is a “fundamental element of due
process.”217 But like with the Fifth Amendment, errors under this
Clause have not been declared, without more, to be structural.218
212. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295–302 (applying harmlesserror analysis to a coerced confession).
213. Really the only lingering question is whether Fulminante would control
if the right against compelled self-incrimination was flouted flagrantly enough
in court to require a finding of mistrial. The Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson
observed that certain “deliberate and especially egregious” errors could destroy
the integrity of proceedings even if the error was normally of the “trial type.”
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993). If so, might the mirrorimage analogue be a total suppression of the right to testify? It is interesting to
recall that Chapman v. California said that “there are some constitutional
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). Among these
rights, the Court cites the defendant’s right, under Payne v. Arkansas, to not
have coerced confessions produced against him. See id. at 25−26 (stating that a
prosecutor commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify “can no more be
considered harmless than the introduction against a defendant of a coerced
confession”); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958) (reversing a judgment
because the court admitted a coerced confession into evidence). But Payne
ceased being the law on the day Fulminante was announced. See Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 288 (stating that the decision “abandons” the Court’s
previous rulings in cases such as Payne).
214. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor . . . .”).
215. Id.
216. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
217. Id. at 18.
218. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987)
Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file reviewed by the trial court to
determine whether it contains information that probably would have
changed the outcome of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new
trial. If the records maintained by CYS contain no such information,
or if the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the
lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction.
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Our conclusion is the only practical one. If right-to-testify
errors are declared to be structural, courts will never find them,
especially when the error can be asserted in most cases in which
the defendant did not testify. It makes sense not to call it
structural error and instead to seek other ways to invigorate the
right.
IV. The Proper Test: Harmless Error Under Chapman/Kotteakos
If structural error and Strickland are not proper standards
for assessing abridgements of the right to testify, that leaves us
with the doctrine of harmless error.219 The standard, on direct
review, is set out in Chapman v. California220: “before a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able
to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.”221 In collateral attacks, courts apply the supposedly more
Compulsory Process errors are not structural, but they are also almost never
harmless. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006) (holding that
the South Carolina rule limiting the defendant’s evidence of third-party guilt to
facts that are inconsistent with his own guilt violates the Compulsory Process
Clause); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (holding that a state
“voucher” rule violates due process).
The right to testify, as noted above, also finds a source in the Due Process
Clause, but that Clause comprehends too many rights in too many
circumstances to make any informative generalization about structural error.
219. We realize that, generally, under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a failure to object to a supposed constitutional error entitles the
complainant only to plain error review, where he has the burden. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered
even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.”). But the nature of the
denial of the right to testify is such that, in the instances most concerning to us,
the defending attorney would have to object to himself. It would also be unfair to
require the defendant to object (where? how?) to his counsel’s effort to silence
him. In any event plain-error review is more appropriate than Strickland review
(same burdens, but no presumptions; and it does not turn on the wrong clause).
In order to make our point we will leave this particular question—plain error or
harmless error—aside.
220. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
221. Id. at 24. Chapman also involved defendant testimony. Id. In that case,
a prosecutor commented on petitioner’s failure to testify. Id. at 19. This was the
very concern that prompted the common-law ban on an accused’s testimony,
which Rock v. Arkansas finally did away with. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
44, 62 (1987) (rejecting Arkansas’s limitation on the defendant’s right to testify
on his own behalf). Chapman speaks in terms of affecting the “result of the
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error-forgiving standard of Kotteakos v. United States222: error
requires reversal only if it had a “substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”223 The principle
behind all harmless-error tests—that courts will not bother with
futile exercises—is expressed in 28 U.S.C. § 2111,224 which directs
courts to review for legal errors “without regard” to those that do
not affect the parties’ “substantial rights.”225 Consider how
dramatically different this is from Strickland’s prejudice test,
where the petitioner must establish “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”226

trial,” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22, but the standard today applies to pretrial
proceedings, post-trial proceedings, plea negotiations, etc.
An amusing historical note: the lawyer who prevailed in Chapman was Mr.
Morris Lavine of Los Angeles, the self-proclaimed “‘attorney for the damned.’”
See Cecilia Rasmussen, Cathedral’s Site a Legal Battleground, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
2,
1996,
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-12-02/local/me-4912_1_legal-battle
ground (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). He represented mobster Mickey Cohen, Teamster Jimmy Hoffa, and
the kidnappers of Frank Sinatra, Jr. See id. (listing Lavine’s infamous clients).
In 1932, he was himself convicted for extortion, served ten months in jail,
received a full pardon, and again became a sought-after lawyer. See id.
(discussing Lavine’s jail time and his reinstatement as a lawyer); see also David
Rosenzweig, POW Camp Atrocities Led to Treason Trial, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2002, http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/20/local/me-onthelaw20 (last visited
Oct. 7, 2012) (elaborating on Lavine’s representation of traitor Tomoyo
Kawakita) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
222. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
223. Id. at 776. The application of this standard to collateral attack was the
work of Brecht v. Abrahamson. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637−38
(1993) (“The Kotteakos standard is thus better tailored to the nature and
purpose of collateral review.”); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007)
(favoring the Kotteakos standard for collateral review). In Brecht, Justice
Stevens, whose concurrence provided the fifth vote, wrote that although the
Kotteakos standard was “less stringent” than Chapman, “[g]iven the critical
importance of the faculty of judgment in administering either standard . . . that
difference is less significant than it might seem.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 643
(Stevens, J., concurring).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006).
225. Id. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or
variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”).
226. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 694 (1984) (emphasis added).
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A. Harmless Error Versus Strickland Prejudice?
But aren’t harmless error and Strickland prejudice
essentially the same inquiry? Aren’t both concerned with the
question: Did it matter in the end? Only superficially. In
Strickland the burden is on the defendant;227 in Chapman and
Kotteakos it is on the government.228 Strickland imposes a “strong
presumption of reliability” about the result;229 the harmless-error
statute expresses a “congressional preference for determining
‘harmless error’ without the use of presumptions.”230 Strickland
tells us to presume in favor of attorney competence;231 harmless
error, again, is freighted with no such presumptions.232
Strickland looks for a “reasonable probability” that the result was
affected by the error;233 harmless error asks whether error was
harmless “beyond a reasonable doubt”234 or caused a “substantial
and injurious effect.”235 Strickland’s thrust is to require a court to
be quite sure, before reversing, that the verdict was attributable
227. See id. at 696 (stating that the defendant has the burden of proving
prejudice in a claim of ineffective counsel).
228. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)
Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly
prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the
person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. It is
for that reason that the original common-law harmless-error rule put
the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there
was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained
judgment.
See also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 771–72 (1946) (finding that
the government did not meet its burden because it did not adequately justify the
errors as harmless).
229. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.
230. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407–08 (2009). This does not apply
in collateral attacks, where there are presumptions of various sorts. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2006) (stating that factual determinations should be
presumed correct).
231. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“[T]he court should recognize that
counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”).
232. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765 (rejecting the use of presumptions in
determining prejudicial effects of error).
233. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 695 (1984).
234. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
235. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).
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to counsel’s error;236 Chapman’s thrust is to require a court to be
quite sure, before affirming, that it was “surely unattributable to
the error.”237 Kotteakos, meanwhile, tells a reviewing judge, when
error is present in the record, to set aside the verdict unless he or
she “is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but
very slight effect.”238
Both standards, to be sure, are rarely met. But the harmlesserror test at least has the virtue of giving the defendant a shot,
unburdened by irrelevant presumptions. The difference is borne
out in the success rates. A 2007 study considered federal circuit
habeas cases between 2003 and 2006 in which a state court found
error but declared it harmless;239 the circuits, on average,
disagreed in 23.5% of cases.240 By contrast, a study that same
year found that less than 1% of Strickland challenges result in
habeas relief.241 This is the difference between asking a court to
say that a mistake was made (what trial is free of them?) and
236. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (requiring the defendant to show that
“counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial”).
237. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis added)
(discussing Chapman).
238. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
239. See Jeffrey S. Jacobi, Note, Mostly Harmless: An Analysis of PostAEDPA Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Harmless Error Determinations,
105 MICH. L. REV. 805, 809–12 (2007) (discussing results from a survey of
habeas corpus cases from January 2003 through June 2006).
240. Id. at 809. Similarly, a study coauthored by Judge Posner and William
Landes considers the 963 federal appellate criminal cases (apparently direct
appeals) decided between 1996 and 1998 in which the majority decided whether
an error was “harmless.” William M. Landes & Richard Posner, Harmless Error
1 (Univ. Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 101 (2d
Series), 2000), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/101.WML_.
Harmless.pdf. In 19% of the cases, defendants had part of their sentence or
conviction reversed, remanded, or vacated. Id. at 21.
241. Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffman, Envisioning Post-Conviction
Review for the Twenty-First Century, 78 MISS. L.J. 433, 440 (2008). Another
study considering federal cases in 1990 and 1992 found that of 584 ineffectiveassistance claims, the petition was “granted” in less than 1%. VICTOR E. FLANGO,
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 62 tbl.
17 (1994). A third study examined more than 2,500 California state and federal
appellate decisions in which an ineffective-assistance claim was raised.
Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of Guilt: Systematic Factors that
Contribute to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CAL. W. L. REV.
263, 323 (2009). It found only 104 decisions in which both deficiency and
prejudice were found, a success rate of 4%. Id. at 323−24.
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asking a court to declare an officer of the bar incompetent (rarely
true, one hopes).242 Professor Nancy J. King, Assistant Reporter
to the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and a coauthor of the latter study, writes that success
under Strickland remains “essentially hypothetical” in noncapital
cases.243
Courts are ill disposed toward ineffective-assistance petitions
because they are the “inevitable” claim.244 Worse yet, they are
unlimited in scope: they can be alleged against everything from
egregious acts like pleading a man guilty against his will245 to (let
us imagine) a simple Homeric nod over one possible objection that
could have been made at some point during a ten-week trial.
Strickland claims also evade the general prohibition on raising
new arguments or presenting new evidence. A decade after
Strickland, the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, described
ineffectiveness claims as “the perfect tactical ‘open sesame’ to
force re-reviews of close cases,” which exact a great toll, though
242. See United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d 634, 638–39 (7th Cir. 2011)
The defendant who has a lawyer, even an incompetent one, must to
establish a violation of his constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel prove that he was prejudiced by the lawyer’s
incompetence . . . and that’s a lot harder to do than opposing a
prosecutor’s claim of harmless error, for the prosecutor must prove
the harmlessness of a constitutional error—and prove it beyond a
reasonable doubt.
(citations omitted).
243. King & Hoffman, supra note 241, at 438.
244. The term is Chief Judge Easterbrook’s. See United States v. Ramsey,
785 F.2d 184,193 (7th Cir. 1986) (“We are left with the inevitable claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.”); see also Wallace v. Davis, 362 F.3d 914, 919
(7th Cir. 2004) (“Thus we arrive at what seems to be the inevitable argument in
capital cases: that counsel at sentencing was ineffective.”); Palermo v. United
States, No. 98-2890, 1999 WL 417867, at *1 (7th Cir. June 17, 1999) (stating
that the motion included “the inevitable staple of § 2255 litigation—a claim that
his prior lawyer was ineffective”). The best figures show that in U.S. district
courts ineffective-assistance claims are raised in 81% of capital cases and 50.4%
of noncapital cases. NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM,
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 64 tbl.15
(2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf. This is
consistent with the figures from 1990 and 1992. See FLANGO, supra note 241, at
45, 59 tbl.16.
245. See United States v. Pellerito, 701 F. Supp. 279, 281 (D.P.R. 1988)
(claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel allegedly encouraged
the defendant to plead guilty against his will).
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to little end, on courts, prosecutors, and defense lawyers
alike.246
In one case, the two standards, harmless error and
Strickland, were actually considered side-by-side to review the
same acts.247 In United States v. Herschberger,248 decided before
the Tenth Circuit adopted Strickland for right-to-testify
claims, the defendant alleged that he told his attorney that he
wanted to testify but “counsel said he would decide.”249 The
defendant made both a right-to-testify claim on grounds that
this right was suppressed and a Strickland claim for counsel’s
failure to advise him that it was the defendant’s decision.250
The court assumed that the first claim was amenable to
harmless-error analysis;251 the other claim was under
Strickland.252 The panel remanded for a hearing on the first
claim but not the second!253
Last year the Eleventh Circuit, apostle of Strickland in
right-to-testify cases, was forced to revisit application of the
harmless-error standard (as opposed to Strickland) because
there was no assistance of counsel: the defendant acted pro se.

246. United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1242 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
247. See United States v. Herschberger, No. 90-3237, 1991 WL 136337, at *3
(10th Cir. Jul. 24, 1991) (evaluating the defendant’s claim of ineffective counsel).
248. Id.
249. Id. at *2.
250. See id. at *1, *3 (describing the defendant’s claims).
251. See id. at *2 (determining that the district court should have held an
evidentiary hearing to assess whether the defendant’s right to testify was
violated).
252. See id. at *3 (using the Strickland test to evaluate the defendant’s
claim that his counsel’s failure to advise him of his right to testify amounted to
ineffective assistance of counsel).
253. See id. at *4 (“Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in failing to grant defendant a hearing on his claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel. In the evidentiary hearing on remand, the district court need only
consider whether defendant’s right to testify was violated.”). Petitioners still
occasionally make this claim. See, e.g., Franklin v. United States, 227 F. App’x
856, 860 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Franklin makes a number of arguments on appeal,
including that the question is not whether his testimony would have altered the
final outcome, rather it is whether he was denied the right to testify. Franklin,
however, must establish deficient performance and prejudice to obtain relief in
this § 2255 motion.”).
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In United States v. Hung Thien Ly,254 the court recalled the
Fifth Circuit’s application of harmless error in the great case of
Wright v. Estelle,255 noted that it since applied the
ineffectiveness framework in Teague, and concluded that the
issue “will be resolved in another case.”256
A 2012 case in the Fifth Circuit illustrates our proposition
about the decisive significance of the standard of review. In
United States v. Wines,257 a man received a 35-year sentence
for drug dealing.258 The Government had one witness, another
dealer, who testified under a plea; the defense had one real
witness, Wines’s mother.259 Wines never testified.260 In a
postconviction hearing, Wines claimed he told his lawyer that
he wanted a “chance to fight for [his] life”261 by testifying; his
attorney recalled that they had decided that Wines would not
testify because of prior convictions.262
A dissenting Judge Higginbotham was sure that
Strickland prejudice was established.263 “This is no easy
254. United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2011).
255. Wright v. Estelle, 549 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1977), aff’d, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th
Cir. 1978) (en banc). All the same, the fractures over the right and the standard
of review for errors were clear. The en banc decision said it “adheres to the panel
opinion as published,” Wright, 572 F.2d at 1072, yet five judges, concurring,
thought it a “disservice” to assume the existence of the right, and then declare a
denial of it to be harmless error. Id. (concurring opinion). Three judges dissented
on grounds that infringement of the right was structural error. See id. at 1080
(dissenting opinion) (arguing that harmless error should not be applied in this
case). In Hung Thien Ly, Judge Tjoflat (by some accounts the longest serving
active federal judge) counted six of fourteen judges who seemed to agree with
harmless-error review. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d at 1318 n.8. He himself was
among the three dissenters some thirty-three years earlier! Id.; Wright, 572
F.2d at 1074 (dissenting opinion) (listing Judge Tjoflat as a dissenter).
256. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d at 1318 n.8.
257. United States v. Wines, 691 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2012).
258. Id. at 601.
259. See id. at 600–01 (describing the witnesses’ testimony).
260. See id. at 601 (“The defense attorney did not call Wines to testify.”).
261. Id. at 602 (alteration in original).
262. See id. at 603 (discussing defense counsel’s assertion “that if Wines had
been called to testify, the government would have quickly asked him about his
prior conviction of a drug-related charge”).
263. See id. at 606 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (“I am persuaded that
counsel’s failure to call Wines was not an objectively reasonable strategic
decision and that Wines was prejudiced.”).
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case,”264 he wrote. Judges Jolly and Southwick, meanwhile,
emphasized Strickland’s “heavy burden” and wrote that “as far as
we can determine, no defendant in any court in the United States
has been able to prove Strickland prejudice on the basis of his
counsel advising him not to testify in his own defense at trial.”265
The point is that the case was close enough to require a
tense, forty-page published opinion from a divided panel. Would
review under a harmlessness standard have produced a different
result? The judges would have considered the effect of the
attorney’s deficiency in failing to call the defendant (they agreed
on that much) without speaking of a “heavy” burden—so heavy it
has never been satisfied. Nor would the majority have referred
repeatedly to the “presumption” of reasonable, strategic action by
the lawyer.266 Losing under Strickland has a momentum of its
own.
It is perhaps a final irony that when the Strickland Court
chose to rely on a “materiality” standard (as with Brady
violations) instead of a harmless-error standard,267 it did so out of
a belief that the materiality standard was actually easier for
264. Id. at 620.
265. Id. at 606 (majority opinion).
266. See, e.g., id. at 603 (discussing the magistrate judge’s finding “that
Wines had not overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s decision was
the result of sound trial strategy”).
267. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (“[T]he
appropriate test for prejudice finds its roots in the test for materiality of
exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution . . . and
in the test for materiality of testimony made unavailable to the defense by
Government deportation of a witness . . . .” (citing United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 104 (1976); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872–74
(1982))). United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal did not apply harmless error or
constitutional standards of review. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458
U.S. 858, 871 (1982) (“We thus conclude that the respondent can establish no
Sixth Amendment violation without making some plausible explanation of the
assistance he would have received from the testimony of the deported
witnesses.”). United States v. Agurs explicitly avoided reliance on the harmlesserror standard:
[S]ince we have rejected the suggestion that the prosecutor has a
constitutional duty routinely to deliver his entire file to defense
counsel, we cannot consistently treat every nondisclosure as though it
were error. It necessarily follows that the judge should not order a
new trial every time he is unable to characterize a nondisclosure as
harmless under the customary harmless-error standard.
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111–12 (1976).
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defendants to meet.268 But despite this solicitude for the fate of
defendants, the importation of that test into the area of denial of
the right to testify has resulted in a right without a remedy.
One might argue that shifting from Strickland to harmless
error will lose the competence prong of review for effective
assistance of counsel. But this is not a problem because, as stated
above, it is almost never within a lawyer’s authority to prevent
the defendant from exercising his personal right to testify.269
V. An Independent “Right to Testify,” a Proposed Test,
and Other Considerations
A. A Suggested Rule for Testing Claims and Ordering Hearings
We should simply speak of an independent “right to testify,”
an undisputed guarantee “implicit” in the Due Process, SelfIncrimination, and Compulsory Process Clauses. It bears a
kinship to Faretta and the autonomy cases, but mostly it is an
application of the foremost right of all: the opportunity to be
heard.270 Usually the accused speaks through his lawyer, but
when a lawyer actively prevents a determined defendant from
testifying, has that defendant really been heard? Claims about
abridgement of the right to testify deserve a freestanding inquiry,
decoupled from Strickland. Courts already use the harmless-error
standard when a statute, a judge, or a prosecutor is to blame.271
Our argument is to use this standard with defense errors, too.
268. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (comparing the burden on the
defendant imposed by the materiality standard to that of other tests).
269. We say “almost” because there are scenarios that could prove
exceptions to the rule. Suppose a man is on trial while under medication for
mental illness and one day is given the wrong pills. If in a schizophrenic state he
demands to take the stand, the lawyer might properly reject his request and
later claim that the defendant was not acting voluntarily or was incompetent to
make the decision.
270. See Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876) (“A sentence of a court
pronounced against a party without hearing him, or giving him an opportunity
to be heard, is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to
respect in any other tribunal.”).
271. See supra notes 99−106 and accompanying text (discussing cases in
which a statute, a court, or a prosecutor caused error). And Rock’s balancing test
applies in cases of conflict between a statute and the right. See Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54−56 (1987) (balancing the interest served by a state’s
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The rule might read:
A defendant has a right at trial to testify truthfully in his own
defense, contrary to advice of counsel, no matter the
evidentiary or strategic detriment, if he timely and clearly
announces his desire to do so to his attorney. A petitioner is
entitled to a hearing as to the abridgment of this right if he
makes a strong showing, based on specific allegations, that his
attorney deprived him of this right.272

In collateral attack it is dangerously easy for a disgruntled
convict to allege that he got bum advice;273 or that he was
pressured into abandoning his chance to testify;274 or that some
medical condition kept him off the stand;275 or that he should
have been asked to waive on the record, etc.276 Before a timeevidentiary rule with the limitation imposed on the defendant’s constitutional
right to testify).
272. We us the term “at trial” here, but one might also include other
occasions, like crucial pre-trial proceedings.
273. See, e.g., United States v. Hood, No. 88-4046, 1989 WL 102017, at *1
(9th Cir. Aug. 25, 1989) (stating that the defendant claimed his attorney
“provided ineffective assistance by giving [the defendant] inaccurate
information”).
274. See, e.g., Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir. 1992)
(describing how the defendant’s attorney pressured the defendant into not
testifying by threatening to withdraw mid-trial).
275. See, e.g., United States v. Pondelick, No. 11-30057, 2012 WL 907488, at
*1 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2012) (noting that the defendant claimed that an abscessed
tooth and infection kept him off the stand, even though he had stated earlier
after “lengthy colloquy” that he did not wish to testify).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Aldea, 450 F. App’x 151, 152 (3d Cir. 2011)
(“Aldea admitted on cross-examination, ‘[b]asically, at the end, yeah, it was my
decision [not to testify] . . . .’”); Lott v. Attorney General of Florida, 594 F.3d
1296, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that the defendant replied “Yes, ma’am”
when the court asked whether it was “a joint choice . . . that [he] would not
testify in the trial); United States v. Bailey, 245 F. App’x 768, 770–71 (10th Cir.
2007) (rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance because petitioner’s affidavit
was “ambiguous,” and counsel submitted a “detailed” account advising Mr.
Bailey to keep silent and listing the “numerous reasons for not wanting to
testify,” like dangers on cross-examination). Further, despite several
opportunities, Mr. Bailey “never once suggested to the court that he wished to
testify.” Id. at 771; see also Winfield v. Roper, 460 F.3d 1026, 1035 (8th Cir.
2006) (“Winfield’s claim that he did not waive his right to testify was fully
explored at the evidentiary hearing in the post-conviction proceedings, and the
state circuit court found that penalty counsel’s testimony was credible, unlike
that of Winfield, Kessler, and Bates.”); Gonzales v. Elo, 233 F.3d 348, 357 (6th
Cir. 2000) (“Indeed, as the magistrate noted, Petitioner did not raise this claim
until nearly six years after his conviction, and after his appeal as of right was
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consuming probe into uncertain credibility and faded (but selfserving) memory is permitted—sometimes years after the events
in question—a defendant must be required to offer a detailed,
who-said-what account of how his right was denied.277 In rare
circumstances the district court might require an affidavit from
the lawyer.278 If a persuasive showing is made, an evidentiary
hearing could find facts and assess the probable effect of the
ungiven testimony. Although a court sometimes may violate the
right, violations by counsel pose the special problem of
unreviewability, since his or her acts are almost always off the
record. Unlike other “personal” rights—to plead guilty, to defend
pro se, to appeal, to waive jury trial—the right to testify is
usually waived behind closed doors, without any assurance that
the client understands his rights beyond what his lawyer tells
him.
Then a district court would need to make a preliminary
inquiry under a harmless-error standard into whether it would
have mattered. This would turn on the strength of the
Government’s evidence, the likely significance to jurors of a
defendant’s appearance on the stand, the centrality (or not) of the
defendant’s ungiven testimony, the probable harms of crossrejected[,] . . . let alone voice any such concern at trial.”); El-Tabech v. Hopkins,
997 F.2d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Although El-Tabech asserts that he raised
his hand several times at trial and was admonished by the judge to address the
court only through his attorneys, our review of the trial transcript has
uncovered no reference to these events.”).
277. See Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that
“particularity” is necessary to give defendant’s claim sufficient credibility to
warrant further judicial investment); Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir.
1987) (finding that no hearing was required over a claim that the defendant was
forbidden to testify because no “specific” and “credible” allegations of compulsion
by counsel were provided in the record).
278. For instance, in Chang v. United States, the court found that the
defendant’s affidavit claiming his right to testify was not explained to him,
although “generic,” could possibly have merited a hearing. Chang v. United
States, 250 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2001). But because the district court
supplemented the record with a “detailed affidavit from trial counsel credibly
describing the circumstances concerning appellant’s failure to testify,” it was
justified in dismissing the complaint without a hearing. Id. at 85. But Jiles v.
United States considered whether a defendant should be obliged to get an
affidavit from his lawyer. Jiles v. United States, 72 F. App’x 493, 494 (7th Cir.
2003). The circuit held that a defendant’s “specific affidavit does not need
corroboration from the very person accused of wrongdoing.” Id. (citing Taylor v.
United States, 287 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2002)).
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examination and impeachment, and the jury’s presumptive view
of the defendant’s credibility.279 If there was an erroneous
abridgement of the right, and it might have mattered, a record
now exists for district and circuit courts to consider alongside
prior proceedings.
B. The Waiver Question
The right-to-testify waiver jurisprudence is well-settled. All
circuits agree that defendants need not waive on the record and
that a court is not obliged to explain the right to the defendant,280
279. In Ortega v. O’Leary, the panel felt that Van Arsdall, a Confrontation
Clause case,
sets the framework for determining whether an error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman: “[The] factors [to
consider] include the importance of the witness’ testimony to the . . .
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence
of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points . . . and of course, the overall strength of
the . . . case.
Ortega v. O’Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)).
280. See Arredondo v. Huibregtse, 542 F.3d 1155, 1165 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he Supreme Court of the United States never has held that a trial court
must engage in a personal colloquy with a defendant to determine whether he
wishes to testify or that a waiver of the right to testify must occur formally on
the record.”); see also Berkovitz v. Minnesota, 505 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 2007)
(declining to adopt a rule requiring all defendants who do not testify to waive
the right on the record); United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 908 (6th Cir.
2007) (stating that defendant’s waiver of his right to testify does not require a
colloquy with the court); United States v. Glenn, 389 F.3d 283, 287 (1st Cir.
2004) (affirming that the trial court is not constitutionally required to advise the
client of his right to testify); United States v. Manjarrez, 258 F.3d 618, 623 (7th
Cir. 2001) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that the Constitution does not require a
trial court to question a defendant sua sponte in order to ensure that his
decision not to testify was undertaken knowingly and intelligently . . . .”);
United States v. Brown, 217 F.3d 247, 258 (5th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the
majority of courts that say a “district court generally has no duty to explain to
the defendant that he or she has a right to testify or to verify that the defendant
who is not testifying has waived the right voluntarily”); United States v.
Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 197–98 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that a trial court
generally has no duty to inform a defendant of his right to testify); United
States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A] trial court not only has
no duty to make an inquiry but, as a general rule, should not inquire as to the
defendant’s waiver of the right to testify.”); United States v. Van De Walker, 141
F.3d 1451, 1452 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming that the appellate court is not
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unless perhaps if he is a pro se defendant.281 This is because
while a judge must inquire of the defendant before taking a guilty
plea or allowing him to waive jury trial or forgo assistance of
counsel,282 there is too great a risk in this context of impeding his
lawyer’s strategy, interfering with the client–counsel
relationship, leading the defendant to believe that testifying is
being suggested, or tempting him to waive the right not to
testify.283 A defendant may not know whether he wishes to testify
required to inquire into defendant’s waiver of the right to testify); Brown v.
Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1997) (placing “no general obligation on the trial
court to inform a defendant of the right to testify and ascertain whether the
defendant wishes to waive that right”); United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066,
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that the trial court does not have a sua sponte
duty to inquire whether the defendant has waived his right to testify); United
States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the trial court has
no duty to advise a defendant of his right to testify or to obtain an on-the-record
waiver); United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 1983) (“[T]here
is no constitutional or statutory mandate that a trial court inquire further into a
defendant’s decision not to testify . . . .”).
But some state courts, because of the “fundamental and personal nature of
the right,” have held that such a colloquy is necessary. Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d
73, 78 (2d Cir. 1997). See, e.g., State v. Neuman, 179 S.E.2d 77, 81–82 (W. Va.
1988) (requiring the record to reflect a “voluntary, knowing and intelligent
relinquishment” of the defendant’s right to testify); People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d
504, 514 (Colo. 1984) (“[T]he constitutional right to testify is so fundamental
that procedural safeguards are necessary to ensure that the defendant
understands the significance of waiver of this right.”); Culberson v. State, 412
So.2d 1184, 1186–87 (Miss. 1982) (suggesting to trial judges of the state to
advise a defendant of his right to testify and to make a record of his waiver); see
also Timothy P. O’Neill, Vindicating the Defendant’s Constitutional Right to
Testify at a Criminal Trial: The Need for an On-the-Record Waiver, 51 U. PITT.
L. REV. 809, 810 (1990) (arguing that defense attorney should put defendant’s
waiver of the right to testify on the record in the judge’s presence).
281. See United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir.
2011)
[T]he district court was required to correct Ly’s misunderstanding of
his right to testify. By not informing Ly that he could testify in
narrative form, the district court denied his right to choose whether
to testify “knowingly and intelligently.” This case falls within one of
the “exceptional, narrowly defined circumstances” that trigger a
district court’s duty to discuss with a criminal defendant his decision
of whether to testify.
282. See United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 1070–71 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(citing Supreme Court cases that require this inquiry).
283. See United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 551–52 (6th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing that waiver of the right to testify “qualitatively differs” from the
right to enter a plea of guilty, waive a jury trial, or forego the assistance of
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until he hears the State’s evidence; the court will not know until
the defense rests.284 Waiving at trial is unlike waiving at a plea
hearing, for a plea is “itself a conviction.”285 A colloquy is probably
necessary only when counsel or defendant tips off a court that a
dispute between them over testifying has arisen.286 A colloquy
then helps to prove waiver later on.287 If a colloquy occurs,
however, caution is necessary so that the court explains to the
defendant that he possesses the right without venturing into
comment on advisability.288
counsel); United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9, 11 (3d Cir. 1995) (reasoning
that it is “inadvisable for a court to question a defendant directly about his or
her waiver of the right to testify”). In United States v. Joelson, the trial judge,
apprised of the defendant’s desire to testify, told him directly: “There’s such a
thing as crucifying yourself when you take the stand and testify. So once again,
I can only say to you that your lawyer is an experienced lawyer and you ought to
follow his advice.” United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 176–77 (9th Cir. 1993).
Despite finding this “troubling” and “inadvisable,” the court of appeals
concluded that the advice “was not so egregious that Joelson’s ability to
knowingly and intentionally waive his right to testify was impaired.” Id. at 178.
284. And at this point, of course, a desire to testify would come too late. See
Pennycooke, 65 F.3d at 11 (stating that “a colloquy on the right to testify” when
the defense rests “not only would be awkward . . . but more importantly
inadvertently might cause the defendant to think that the court believes the
defense has been insufficient” (citation omitted)).
285. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
286. See Arredondo v. Huibregtse, 542 F.3d 1155, 1157 (7th Cir. 2008)
(involving such interruptions); Ortega v. O’Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 260 (7th Cir.
1988) (same). The Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction seems stocked with unruly
defendants.
287. See United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1986)
(finding that despite the defendant’s claim that his trial counsel would not allow
him to take the stand, the defendant “bypassed an opportunity to support such a
claim in the district court”). The court noted that “[n]othing in the record
supports the assertion that counsel thwarted [the defendant’s] desire to testify,”
and “[t]o the contrary, the district judge asked [the defendant] during the trial
whether he wanted to testify.” Id.
288. See, e.g., United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“Experience demonstrates that district courts sometimes provide
inappropriate commentary when they inject themselves into a defendant’s
choice of whether to testify.”); United States v. Yono, 605 F.3d 425, 426 (6th
Cir. 2010) (advising against a colloquy into the defendant’s waiver of his
right to testify); United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 1998)
(stating that a trial court should avoid encouraging or discouraging a
defendant to testify); United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9, 13 (3d Cir.
1995) (noting that sometimes a trial court might have to “inquire discreetly”
to ensure that a defendant’s constitutional rights are not suppressed);
Joelson, 7 F.3d at 178 (discussing the danger of “judicial interference
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The waiver inquiry tests whether the defendant made a
knowing, intelligent relinquishment.289 In nearly every case in
which a defendant does not testify or inform the court of a desire
to do so, waiver should be presumed or inferred.290 Defense
counsel would always have primary responsibility for advising
the defendant on the right and the implications of exercising it.291
A good test must catch instances in which a defendant is stripped
of his right without adding new layers to the already extensive
protections for criminal defendants.

with this strategic decision”); United States v. Goodwin, 770 F.2d 631, 635–38
(7th Cir. 1985) (stating that “[t]he trial judge . . . went beyond his limited
function of ensuring that Goodwin’s decision not to testify was voluntary when
he expressed surprise . . . , explained some of the pros and cons of her taking the
stand, and strongly implied that her only chance for acquittal was to testify”);
Arthur v. United States, 986 A.2d 398, 407 (D.C. 2009) (stating that a trial
judge has “responsibility to ensure that the weight of judicial authority does not
unduly influence” the defendant’s exercise of his right to testify). See also
United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 396 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a
trial court need not inquire into waiver, and that even if a court does inquire, it
has no duty to ensure that waiver was knowing and voluntary). Such a rule
“would actually disfavor criminal defendants by tending to discourage judges
from conducting any inquiry at all of a silent defendant.” Id.
289. See United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir.
2011) (“Like other fundamental trial rights, the right to testify is truly protected
only when the defendant makes his decision knowingly and intelligently.”);
United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 1998) (“If a defendant does
waive this right [to testify], the waiver must be knowing, voluntary and
intelligent.”).
290. See United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Thus,
waiver of the right to testify may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct and
is presumed from the defendant’s failure to testify or notify the court of his
desire to do so.”). Because the question arises in every trial, and is generally
decided between client and counsel without inquiry, federal courts really have
no choice but to make this presumption. See Hodge v. Haeberlin, 579 F.3d 627,
639 (6th Cir. 2009) (ruling that although the right to testify is a fundamental
right subject only to knowing and intelligent waiver, “‘waiver of certain
fundamental rights can be presumed from a defendant’s conduct alone, absent
circumstances giving rise to a contrary inference’” (quoting United States v.
Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 908 (6th Cir. 2007))).
291. See Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d at 1313 (“In cases where a defendant is
represented by counsel, counsel is responsible for providing the advice needed to
render the defendant’s decision of whether to testify knowing and intelligent.”);
United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Thus, defense
counsel, not the court, has the primary responsibility for advising the defendant
of his right to testify and for explaining the tactical implications of doing so or
not.”).
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The right to testify remains circumscribed by other
legitimate trial interests and rules of evidence or procedure.292
These operate to disallow testimony on subjects ruled
inadmissible after in limine motions,293 to prevent false
testimony,294 to prohibit unreliable forms of evidence,295 to
maintain fair, orderly proceedings,296 to ensure that any
testimony is given after oath or affirmation,297 to keep an unruly
defendant from degrading the trial,298 or perhaps to inhibit a
mentally defective defendant from sinking himself on the
stand.299 A defendant may not claim that his right to testify is
292. See United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 350 (2d Cir. 1983) (agreeing
with the district court that although defendant wanted to testify about duress,
such testimony was inadmissible because irrelevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402).
293. See United States v. Flores-Martinez, 677 F.3d 699, 709 (2012)
(considering the rights of a defendant seeking to testify on matters specifically
excluded by the ruling of the trial court).
294. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173–74 (1986) (stating there is “no
permissible choice to testify falsely”).
295. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987) (“In applying its
evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule
justify the limitation imposed on the defendant’s constitutional right to
testify.”). Arkansas could not, without better evidence, ban entirely a
defendant’s use of hypnotically refreshed memory. See id. at 61.
296. See United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 59–60 (8th Cir. 1989) (allowing
a court to exercise discretion, in the interests of fairness and order, to refuse to
reopen evidence for testimony when defendant asserted his right to testify only
after the evidence-taking stage of the trial was closed, though before it was sent
to the jury). A court might find that the defendant is trying to engage in delay or
other improper purpose.
297. See United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1406 (4th Cir. 1969)
(disallowing a defendant who was a conscientious objector from testifying
because of a religious inability to swear on the Bible and raise his hand). The
circuit remanded for a new trial, instructing that “all the district judge need do
is to make inquiry as to what form of oath or affirmation would not offend
defendant’s religious beliefs but would give rise to a duty to speak the truth.” Id.
at 1407.
298. See United States v. Bentvana, 319 F.2d 916, 944 (2d Cir. 1963)
(discussing the misbehaving defendant’s right to testify). The defendant had
engaged in “outbursts and serious misconduct” and the judge was bound to
“maintain the order and decorum necessary for a fair trial.” Id. But the circuit
nonetheless found that the court should have allowed the testimony “[i]n view of
the importance of the privilege” and instead have had a marshal subdue or gag
him if he continued to insist on disobeying court orders. Id.
299. See People v. Robles, 466 P.2d. 710, 716 n.1 (Cal. 1970) (“In some
situations a defendant’s persistence in testifying contrary to his attorney’s
advice might raise questions as to the defendant’s present sanity.”); see also
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tread upon by rules allowing cross-examination or impeachment
with prior convictions and bad acts.300 The Supreme Court has
also held that obstruction of justice enhancements are no burden
on the right.301 An accused who testifies is in the position of any
other witness: duty-bound to speak truthfully, entitled to the
same privileges, and exposed to the same perils of impeachment,
stress, embarrassment, and so on.
It is well-established that the right to testify may be waived
only by the defendant.302 According to Chief Judge Frank
Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2003)
Ward’s counsel admitted that it wasn’t his client, but he who had
made the decision to keep Ward off the stand. He further told the
court that he didn’t believe he could have an informed discussion with
Ward about the decision, since most of his prior exchanges with his
client were one-sided, generating only an occasional ‘uh-uh’ response
from Ward.
300. See United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 705–06 (2d Cir. 2012)
(discussing how an apparently unstable defendant took the stand, to her
detriment, over counsel’s strenuous urging). On appeal, Ms. Siddiqui’s lawyer
argued that “in some cases a defendant may be competent to stand trial yet
incompetent to exercise her right to testify without the approval of defense
counsel.” Id. at 705. The court declined to decide this question. Id. at 705–06.
The case is also a fine example of the lengths to which a zealous defense lawyer
and a concerned judge can go to help a defendant avoid self-inflicted wounds,
short of compulsion. See id. at 698 n.4 (discussing the lengths to which they
went). See also People v. Robles, 466 P.2d. 710, 716 n.1 (Cal. 1970) (“In some
situations a defendant’s persistence in testifying contrary to his attorney’s
advice might raise questions as to the defendant’s present sanity.”); Ward v.
Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2003)
Ward’s counsel admitted that it wasn’t his client, but he who had
made the decision to keep Ward off the stand. He further told the
court that he didn’t believe he could have an informed discussion with
Ward about the decision, since most of his prior exchanges with his
client were one-sided, generating only an occasional ‘uh-uh’ response
from Ward.
301. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993) (rejecting the
defendant’s argument that courts will enhance sentences whenever the accused
takes the stand and is found guilty).
302. See United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007) (ruling
that only the defendant may waive the right to testify in his own defense (citing
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987))). Dozens of cases confirm this proposition.
See, e.g., Galowski v. Murphy, 891 F.2d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 1989) (providing an
early post-Strickland, post-Rock statement of this rule of law). Teague
acknowledged that the “right is personal to the defendant and cannot be waived
either by the trial court or by defense counsel . . . . [T]here can be no effective
waiver of a fundamental constitutional right unless there is an ‘intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right of privilege.’” United States v.
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Easterbrook, the distinction between this and the ordinary rights
of trial management (whether to call a witness, object to hearsay,
etc.), is that the former are choices in which “one does not need a
legal education to appreciate the issues.”303
The presumption against the waiver of constitutional
rights304 is why a judge who accepts a plea must ensure that the
defendant grasps what he is waiving.305 Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 requires a court to inquire about the defendant’s
awareness of his rights to plead not guilty, have a jury trial, and
secure counsel.306 Another provision of Rule 11 directs the court
to inform the defendant of his “right at trial to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses, to be protected from compelled selfincrimination, to testify and present evidence, and to compel the
attendance of witnesses.”307 Each of the rights just listed appears
in Madison’s Bill of Rights—except the “right to testify.” Yet
today a plea is invalid unless the court ensures waiver of the
right “personally in open court.”308
Finally, any rule requiring a defendant to gainsay his
attorney in front of a judge to avoid an inference of waiver seems
unfair; if anyone, it is the lawyer’s job to expose disagreement.309
Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532−33 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
303. Babul, 476 F.3d at 500.
304. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973) (“A strict
standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaranteed to a criminal
defendant to insure that he will be accorded the greatest possible opportunity to
utilize every facet of the constitutional model of a fair criminal trial.”); Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70–71 (1942) (stating that the court must “indulge
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights” but
must also protect those rights by ensuring that the waiver is “intelligent” and
“competent”); see also Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 5 n.4 (1966) (“When
constitutional rights turn on the resolution of a factual dispute we are duty
bound to make an independent examination of the evidence in the record.”).
305. At the same time, there can really be no presumption against waiver of
the right to testify without presuming an intent to abandon the right to remain
silent. No presumptions should apply to this choice between silence and speech.
306. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B)–(D).
307. Id. 11(b)(1)(E) (emphasis added). The right to testify is recognized
elsewhere in the rules. See, e.g., id. 12.3(c) (stating that a public-authority
defense can be barred under certain circumstances but that this “does not limit
the defendant’s right to testify”).
308. Id. 11(b)(2).
309. See United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 760–61 (9th Cir. 1989)
(stating that a defendant may not waive his right to testify under his lawyer’s
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Instances in which a defendant does pipe up seem to involve
uncommonly self-assured men, like the one who shouted of his
lawyer—“He lies. Lies. Lies.”—until the court threatened to
remove him.310 From the case law it also appears that a trial
judge is likelier to regard such efforts as irksome impertinence
rather than an alarm that a right is going unheeded.311
C. Due Process Clause Inquiry?
The Due Process Clause generally applies to violations
committed by the state, not a lawyer.312 One might argue that
because the State brings the case (prosecutor), conducts the trial
advice and then try to invalidate the trial because he decided to abide by his
lawyer’s counsel), vacated, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991); see also United States
v. McMeans, 927 F.2d 162, 163 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that waiver was
appropriate partly because the defendant’s testimony at an earlier trial evinced
knowledge of the right to testify); United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749,
751–52 (8th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that the defendant did not object when his
counsel rested without calling him to the stand). But see Chang v. United
States, 250 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing the inconsistency of requiring
a defendant to rely on his attorney to speak for him in the courtroom and
holding that by failing to speak the defendant has waived his right to testify);
United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recognizing that it is
impracticable to put a burden on the defendant who might not even be aware of
the right he possesses and that the burden would conflict with the instruction
that a defendant should speak through his counsel); Underwood v. Clark, 939
F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusing to treat a defendant’s silence as a waiver
of the right to testify because the defendant might feel “too intimidated to speak
out of turn in this fashion”); United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 759–60
(11th Cir. 1990) (refusing to find “that by failing to speak out at the proper time
a defendant has made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of a personal
right of fundamental importance such as the right to testify”), vacated, 932 F.2d
899 (11th Cir. 1991).
310. See Arredondo v. Huibregtse, 542 F.3d 1155, 1157–64 (7th Cir. 2008)
(containing a tense exchange); see also United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237,
254 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, J., dissenting) (“How could he make such a request?
Leggett could not very well have disrupted the proceedings by standing in open
court and speaking directly to the judge without being asked anything.”).
311. See, e.g., Leggett, 162 F.3d at 254 (noting that the judge “feared” that
Leggett might “jump to his feet and assert his right to testify”).
312. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998)
(describing the Due Process Clause as limiting what the government may do);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905) (stating that under the Due
Process Clause “no state can deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law”).
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(judge), and executes the sentence (warden), failure to ensure a
trial in which a defendant’s right to testify is respected is state
action. This is the theory behind why certain attorney conduct—
like failing to disclose a material conflict of interest—still
implicates state action.313 But again, a stand-alone “right to
testify” inquiry is needed.314
VI. Conclusion
Taking the long view, the constitutional right to testify is a
novelty. Over three centuries, what was prohibited to a defendant
became a statutory privilege, then a sort of assumed right, and
finally an explicit constitutional command.315 In federal courts it
took a century for the statutory privilege (1878)316 to harden into
constitutional right (1987).317 During the 1960s and ’70s it was
313. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980) (“This Court’s decisions
establish that a state criminal trial, a proceeding initiated and conducted by the
State itself, is an action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
314. Under the Sixth Amendment’s “presumed prejudice” line, courts decline
to scour the record to ascertain the degree of prejudice. These are cases where,
for instance, a lawyer carelessly forfeited an appeal. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega,
528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000) (“The even more serious denial of the entire judicial
proceeding itself . . . similarly demands a presumption of prejudice.”). Or where
a lawyer failed to comply with Anders and left his client uncounseled on appeal.
See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88–89 (1988) (“It is therefore inappropriate to
apply either the prejudice requirement of Strickland or the harmless-error
analysis of Chapman.”). Presumed prejudice is a form of structural error: both
involve mistakes that foreclosed an avenue, disabled the creation of a record, or
raised barriers to determining what might have happened. We feel prejudice
should not be presumed for the same reasons the error here is not structural.
Every circuit has rejected the claim, occasionally made, for presumed prejudice.
See, e.g., Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 396–97 (3d Cir. 2010) (determining
there is no presumption of prejudice for right-to-testify cases).
315. Few would argue that if competency statutes in the states and U.S.
Code were repealed, courts of this country would once again be permitted to
deny defendants the power to choose to testify. It might also be remembered
that both the right to testify and the common law rule against defendant
testimony were alike intended to bring out the truth and protect the defendant
(which, as noted, was once thought best done by prohibiting all defendants from
testifying, so that no harmful inferences for failure to speak would be made by
the jury).
316. See 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2006) (federal competency statute first enacted in
1878).
317. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (“The right to testify on
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still treated as a trial tactic.318 But when finally
constitutionalized it became necessary for courts to decide how to
review alleged infringements. Because it seemed like a matter of
lawyer ineffectiveness, the U.S. courts of appeals, in the 1990s,
reached for the familiar Strickland standard. The problem, we
see, is that Strickland frustrates the right. Rarely will an
overbearing attorney’s conduct provoke a postconviction inquiry;
almost never will it lead to a new result. The court is usually
satisfied to concede a violation of right while squinting in vain to
find prejudice. And no wonder: the lawyer is almost always right
to restrain his client. Yet the proper avenue is not Strickland but
an independent, constitutional inquiry. The first court to do so
gets to name it.`

one’s own behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several provisions of the
Constitution.”)
318. See United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004, 1009 (10th Cir. 1971)
(“[T]he decision of counsel to place or not to place his client on the stand has
been described as particularly difficult, and has generally been treated as a
question of trial tactics.”); see also United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795, 797
(2d Cir. 1963) (expressing the statement of old view, before Rock and Strickland,
that denial of right to testify is strategic and there is no remedy for strategic
error); Seth Dawson, Due Process v. Defense Counsel’s Unilateral Waiver of the
Defendant’s Right to Testify, 3 HASTINGS L.Q. 517, 523 (1975) (“There is a
growing recognition that the right to testify has transcended its statutory
origins and is now emerging as a constitutionally protected right, inherent in
the ever-broadening concept of due process.”). In 1993, the Ninth Circuit said it
“essentially is a strategic trial decision with constitutional implications.” United
States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 178 (9th Cir. 1993).

